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I. INTRODUCTION: THE STATE'S ATrITUDES TOWARD
ALTERNATIVES TO ADJUDICATION
At the end of each year, newspapers do "round ups" of events,
attempting to summarize and to take stock of what has transpired over the
preceding twelve months. As the end of a century approaches, the impulse
for assessment grows greater. We have the luxury, the obligation, or the
conceit of contemplating a goodly period of time, to ask the questions
inscribed on the famous Gauguin painting: "Where do we come from? What
are we? Where are we going?" 1
In this lecture, I place those questions in the context of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR") and adjudication, in the hopes of gaining
insights into the future of adjudicatory procedures as we approach the end
of the twentieth century. Below, I map both the changing attitudes toward
ADR and the claims made on behalf of ADR, as well as changing attitudes
toward adjudication and its attributes.
As the title for this lecture forecasts, my review prompts me to be less
optimistic than others about the array of options that are and will be
available to litigants seeking decision making from the state. The
assumption of many proponents, that ADR will increase the options
available to litigants within the publicly financed system, may not be borne
out. As the state makes alternative dispute resolution its own, both ADR
and adjudication are being reconceptualized. As we proceed into the next
century, the commitment to twentieth century style adjudication is waning.
In this interaction, we may soon find ourselves with a narrower, not a
richer, range of forms of dispute resolution.
As is familiar, neither adjudication nor alternative dispute resolution
are inventions of this century, nor are they static concepts. Further, as
Professor Ian MacNeil has recently explained, state-based adjudication is
the "Johnny-come-lately" to the dispute resolution process. 2 MacNeil has
provided a history of the law of arbitration in the United States; his work is
helpful to my enterprise. 3 He takes as his task to correct the understanding
I Paul Gauguin, "D'ou venons-nous? Que sommes-nous? Ou allons-nous?," 1897,
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Tompkins Collection. See MICHAEL GIBSON, PAUL GAUGUIN
(Rizzoli, 1993).
2 IAN R. MAcNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 4 (1992).
3 His recently published history of twentieth century attitudes toward arbitration also
provides a helpful cautionary caveat to my comments here. All scholars of dispute resolution
must take care when making claims about nineteenth century attitudes toward courts and other
forms of dispute resolution. Given limited records and research of that period, definitive
statements about the relative value attributed to adjudication and to other forms of dispute
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of the law in the United States about "private" agreements between parties
to arbitrate disputes.4 The description commonly offered is that "the law"
has long taken a dim view of the enforcement of such contracts and of
arbitration in general. MacNeil brings a different perspective to what he
terms this historical picture of "unrelieved judicial or legislative hostility to
arbitration." 5
MacNeil argues that the standard story is wrong; that during the
nineteenth century, state legislatures and the common law looked favorably
on agreements to arbitrate.6 He uses, as illustration, legislation such as an
Illinois statute of 1873, which permitted parties to refer pending cases to
arbitration and to have the help of the court in setting up the arbitration
process. 7 With MacNeil's work and other research, contemporary critics of
courts can invoke comments from nineteenth century lawyers and judges
who, like today's lawyers and judges, complained about adjudication as
slow and costly and argued for arbitration (as well as "mediation and
conciliation"8) as alternative means of resolving disputes.
MacNeil's questions (What came first? Alternative dispute resolution or
dispute resolution by the state? What was the state's attitude toward private
agreements to arbitrate?) provide a point of departure for my discussion
about late twentieth century attitudes and assumptions. Professor MacNeil
posits the existence of two systems during both the nineteenth and the
twentieth centuries: on the one hand, adjudication as the dispute resolution
system of the state, and on the other hand, "private" dispute resolution
systems. MacNeil then traces the changing tone of the state's attitudes
toward the relationship of the two systems-first encouragement (in the
nineteenth century) with some reservations; then hostility and
unenforceability of agreements to arbitrate (in the first half of the twentieth
century); and most recently, an embrace of such agreements and the
federalization of arbitration law in the United States.
resolution are difficult to substantiate.
4 MacNeil describes one of his purposes as correcting the historical record and
demonstrating that judicial "hostility" to the enforcement of arbitration is not as longstanding
as some have claimed. MAcNEmL, supra note 2, at 17-21.
5 Id. at 19.
6 Id. at 17-24.
7 id. at 17-18, 183 & n.10 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, 1-18 (Hurd, 1915-16),
and referring to an earlier, similar act dating from 1845).
8 See Edgar J. Lauer, Conciliation and Arbitration in the Municipal Court of the City of
New York, I AM. JUDICATUR Soc'y 153 (1918) (criticizing trial as a "battle," and urging a
"new method of disposing of the great mass of disputes and contentions that ordinarily are
brought to court" by rules of the Board of Justices of the Municipal Court of the City of New
York and providing for conciliation and arbitration).
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My description of more recent history (primarily the last four decades)
provides another framing. MacNeil's major assumption-two distinct
systems in conversation with each other, with ADR existing apart from the
state 9-is decreasingly reflective of contemporary trends. During the last
few decades, ADR has become an integral part of the state's mechanisms
for responding to disputes.10 From one perspective, the two systems are no
longer discrete conversants but have begun to be "integrated," "melded,"
or "collapsed" into each other. From another vantage point, the state's
system is increasingly in disarray, and the "private" system is becoming the
one of choice, when litigants have the resources and ability to "opt out."11
Of course, which description to offer-"integration," "melding,"
"collapse," or something else-depends on one's views about the
desirability of the co-mingling, conflation, and alteration of the two mode
of decision making. I will return to this point after I establish my prior
claim: the merging modes of dispute resolution.12 To trace this blurring of
9 Occasional examples exist of state incorporation of different forms of dispute
resolution. See, e.g., id. at 153-54 (arbitration under the 1915 rules of New York City's
Municipal Court included the option of using the judge as an arbitrator as a means of
dispelling the objection that arbitrators were neither experienced in settling disputes nor
sufficiently independent from the parties). However, the extent of contemporary efforts at
such integration marks the development (detailed below) of something different from those
prior examples.
10 As the Honorable Ann Claire Williams, the representative of the Judicial Conference
of the United States ("the policy making body of the federal judiciary"), explained in her
testimony on proposed expansion of court-annexed arbitration in the federal courts, "Judicial
use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) programs was firmly grounded in the Federal
Courts" prior to 1990, when Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act. See The Court
Arbitration Authorization Act of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 1102 Before Subcom. on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (May 5, 1993) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1102]. See also discussion,
infra Parts IVB-E.
11 See Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A Framework
for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12B STUD. IN LAW, POL. & Soc'Y 367, 374
(Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat eds., 1992) ("Courts will compete for desirable business, and
some of the reforms within public courts that have been described as privatization can be seen
as part of the competitionfor an attractive dispute resolution process.") (emphasis in original);
Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L. REv. 891, 892 (1993)
("The courts face a burgeoning industry in alternative dispute resolution... that threatens to
siphon off many civil cases, including those of litigants wealthy enough to afford it.").
12 In a future essay, I will address what will not be detailed here: the relationships
among administrative adjudication, ADR, and court-based adjudication. I do want to note that
one way to conceptualize the growth of administrative adjudication is to understand it as
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forms, I will turn to conversations among judges, members of Congress, the
Executive, and lawyers, all speaking about the reasons for adopting ADR
programs.
Before doing so, I should note that my focus here is internal to the civil
dispute resolution system, about what reforms were proposed as
programmatic change and how they were contrasted with adjudication. 13 I
am here following Professor Stephen Yeazell's injunction to seek to
understand the "relationship among the changes" within a procedural
system. 14 Of course, considerations of dispute resolution must also entail
many forces that shape procedural reformation. Other variables (from
market incentives, technology, 15 the structure of the legal profession, the
nature of manufacturing to international relations) are also important parts
of the story of the changing forms of civil dispute resolution.16 Further, as I
ADR, a diversion of disputes from court-based adjudication to a forum perceived to be
quicker, easier, and better suited for certain disputes. Further, the interaction between
administrative adjudication and court-based adjudication has resulted in some melding of
forms, as well as in some transposition of adjudication in certain kinds of individual cases,
from federal courts to federal agencies, who rely for adjudication, on pretrial processes more
limited than those available in federal courts.
13 Yet another topic is the relationship between civil and criminal caseloads.
Commentators believe that increased criminal jurisdiction coupled with the flow of resources
to and popular demand for prosecution have resulted in diminished resources for civil
adjudication. Charles E. Lindner, With the Courts Crowded, Private 'Justice'for the Rich and
Famous, L.A. TIsMs, Dec. 25, 1994, at M6 (In December of 1994, "23 of the 40 civil-trial
courts" in downtown Los Angeles were converted to use for criminal case.). In the federal
system, criminal filings increased by 50 percent between 1981 and 1991 and criminal cases
per judgeship rose by 10 percent. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, at 494, Table 5.23,
5.24. Research on the federal side shows that criminal dockets vary by jurisdiction, thus
having a more complex interaction with the civil docket. See, e.g., Terence Dunworth &
Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and the Federal Courts: The Guidelines Experience, 66
S. CAL. L. REv. 99, 131, 133 (1992) (criminal trial rates varied by kind of offense; criminal
filings varied by districts).
14 Stephen C. Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. Rsv. 631, 632 (emphasis in original).
15 Computers and the ability to photocopy have had a critical impact on twentieth
century procedural history; it is difficult to imagine what would have been the perception and
use of discovery, had it emerged without the capacity to create and copy vast numbers of
documents.
16 See Garth, supra note 11, at 368 ("[W]e cannot understand developments outside the
courts without relating them to developments inside the courts; ... national developments
must be understood in relationship to transnational phenomena."). See also Harry N.
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develop, the attitudes that inform contemporary revisions of dispute
resolution are related to views on the role and limits of government. 17
II. THE CALL FOR MANY DooRs
In this lecture, my interest is narrower than that vast world. So I turn
back less than two decades, to 1976 and the Pound Conference, 18 a meeting
of some 250 judges, lawyers, court administrators, law professors, and non-
lawyers at which Professor Frank Sander called for a "multi-doored"
courthouse. 19 Reviewing his published comments is useful, for what was
written not yet twenty years ago seems like it was aimed at a group of
people removed from us by many more than two decades.
Professor Sander took as his burden the need to explain the "significant
characteristics of various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms." 20 He
assumed his readership's familiarity with adjudication; his task was to
educate his readers on what else there was and then to persuade his readers
Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History of Judicial Reform and the
California Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2049, 2051-57 (1993) (considering both external and
internal factors affecting California courts).
17 See, e.g., Rashi Fein, The Politics of Health Reform, DiSSEN'r, Winter 1994, at 43
(Health care reform efforts in 1993-94 were defined by assumptions of a preference for
private-sector action.).
18 Honorable Avem Cohn, The Pound Conference, 60 MICH. B.J. 35 (January 1981)
(reviewing THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECMVES ON JUSTIcE IN THE FUTURE (Leo Levin
& Russell R. Wheeler, eds., 1979) [hereinafter THE POUND CONFERENCE]). See also Opinion
& Comment. Pound Revisited, 62 A.B.A. J. 359 (1976). The 1976 Pound Conference invoked
the 1906 Roscoe Pound speech, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, delivered Aug. 29, 1906 in St. Paul, Minnesota, to the ABA's
annual meeting, and which served as another landmark in the history of procedural reform.
See 29 A.B.A. Rep. 396 (1906), and THE POUND CONFERENCE.
19 In his essay, Professor Sander did not use that phrase; he termed his model not
.simply a courthouse but a Dispute Resolution Center." Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of
Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 131 (1976), which was a part of the materials from the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976). Others have come to cite Sander as proposing the "multi-
doored courthouse." See, e.g., The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Report of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 n.15 (Aug. 3, 1990); Robert B.
McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 818, 824
(1988); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 424, 427 n.17 (1986); Charles Thensted,
Litigation and Less: The Negotiation Alternative, 59 TUL. L. REv. 76, 93 (1984).
20 Sander, supra note 19, at 113.
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of the desirability and utility of those "alternative dispute resolution
forms." His purpose was to suggest "promising avenues to explore." 21
Professor Sander's key move was to focus the discussion not on
substantive areas (i.e., should tax cases go to a specialized court?) but rather
on process. He urged that across a wide variety of disputes, the process
should be elaborated, and a mediation, conciliation, or alternative phase be
incorporated into it.22 Professor Sander pointed to some experiments with
these processes, labeled "alternative dispute resolution," as evidence of the
plausibility of his proposals. 23
Pause to consider the metaphor that has come to encapsulate his ideas: a
"multi-doored courthouse. "24 The image has a good deal of appeal,
stemming in part from its implicit reliance on the phrase "access to justice"
to posit a structure with several doors of entry. In his reprinted speech,
Frank Sander actually described a "lobby" in which a litigant could be
"channelled through a screening clerk"2 to one of six doors, comprising "a
diverse panoply of dispute resolution processes."26 Specifically, one might
be sent to "mediation, arbitration, fact finding, malpractice screening panel,
superior court," or an ombudsperson.27
While "flexible," 28 this model also assumed something presumably
stable: the courthouse was a known, readily conjured-up entity. In fact, one
of the doors in the Sander lobby was to something called the "superior
court." Moreover, one of Professor Sander's goals was to "reserve the
courts for those activities for which they are best suited and to avoid
swamping and paralyzing them with cases that do not require their unique
abilities."29 Whatever the number of doors, the call was for access to and
preservation of the courthouse.
21 Sander, supra note 19, at 133.
22 Id. at 127. Professor Sander thus echoed the trans-substantive premises of the 1938
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide one set of procedures across a wide array of
substantive disputes. See Robert M. Cover, Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718 (1975); Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 2219
(1989).
23 He suggested criteria, including the nature of the dispute, the relationship among the
parties, the amount in dispute, the cost of disputing, and the speed of decision making, as
relevant to determining what form of dispute resolution is appropriate. Sander, supra note 19,
at 118-26.
24 See supra note 19.
25 1& at 131.
2 6 Id. at 130.
27 Id. at 131.
28 Id. at 131.
29 Sander, supra note 19, at 132.
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It is fair to say that, within a very short time period (less than two
decades), Frank Sander's call has been heard. It is worth mapping that shift,
from disinterest and some hostility toward ADR to the embrace of it as a
mode of responding to disputes.
III. ADR AS A GENERIC FORM
Before detailing the shift, both in practice and in ideology, to show the
markers in law and doctrine that delineate the state's endorsement of ADR,
a definitional framework for alternative dispute resolution is needed. Thus
far, my shorthand phrase "ADR" has assumed a uniformity of activity
unfair to the complexity and richness of the ADR arena.30 I will not detail
all its array here, but I do not want to be heard as blurring distinctive
aspects of the many modes of dispute resolution under the ADR umbrella.
As Frank Sander's metaphor makes plain, there are differences among
forms of ADR.
While the current vocabulary of ADR could enable a lengthy discussion
of distinctions among processes now called arbitration, court-annexed
arbitration, mediation, med-arb, mini-trial, summary jury trial, early
neutral evaluation, and judicial settlement conferences, 31 all of these forms
involve the state's introduction to the disputants of a third party, who is
called upon to do something.32 Therefore, I will group the various methods
into modes that are delineated by the nature of the work of that third party.
A first mode is quasi-adjudicatory; this form of ADR offers a
truncated, abbreviated fact-finding process that yields an outcome, decided
by a third party, in the hopes that with that result, the parties will conclude
their dispute. Both private contractual and court-annexed arbitration fit this
mode. The difference is that under contractual arbitration, individuals or
entities have an agreement, predating a dispute, to arbitrate, and that
agreement also specifies the mechanism for selection of arbitrators. In
contrast, under many court-annexed arbitration programs, litigants are sent
to arbitration without such prior agreements and have varying amounts of
30 See generally STEPHEN GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY ROGERS,
DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 1-240 (2d ed.
1992).
31 See, e.g., id at 4-5 (table of dispute processes and identifying some nine forms and
examining them by characteristics including degrees of formality, whether binding or non-
binding, and whether public or private).
32 See also Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEG. STUD. 1, 1 (1995) (noting variation among forms of ADR, but also that all "share the
feature that a third party is involved who offers an opinion or communicates information about
the dispute to the disputants").
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control over the selection of arbitrators. Court-annexed arbitration typically
permits parties to reject the arbitrator's decision and litigate, albeit
sometimes with penalties and disincentives. However, if the parties do not
object, the judgment of the arbitrator functions as a judgment of the court.33
Under both court-annexed and contractual arbitration, the assumption is
that information, provided to an outsider, will enable that outsider to render
a fair outcome. What makes this process not adjudication is that the
proceeding is not conducted by a state-employed individual who bears the
title "judge," formal evidentiary rules do not apply, and opinions are often
not written.34 It is, however, important to keep in mind that this process
shares with adjudication a commitment to a case-specific outcome made by a
third party and predicated upon an inquiry into the claims of fact made by
disputants.
A second mode of ADR also relies upon some third party intervention
but for a different purpose. A third party is introduced not to make a
decision, but rather to inform the disputants of how outsiders view the
dispute and how these outsiders would decide, were they asked to do so.
The hope is that with such information, the disputants themselves will
obviate the need for third party intervention by settling their differences.
That settlement, however, is presumed to have been shaped in light of the
views of the outsiders. The views of those outsiders, in turn, are presumed
to have been shaped by the information that the parties' provided in a
format akin to adjudication. In both "summary jury trials" and "mini-
33 Deborah Hensler, Court-Ordered Arbitration: An Alternative View, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 399. Under 28 U.S.C. § 658 (1988), ten federal district courts have the authority to
mandate arbitration in particular kinds of cases and an additional ten have authorization to
create voluntary programs. Both are nonbinding proceedings. As of 1993, eight of the ten
districts authorized to have voluntary programs had been operating such programs for more
than a year. DAVID RAUMA & CAROL KRAFKA, VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION IN EIGHT FEDERAL
DIsTRICr COURTS: AN EVALUATION (Fed. Jud. Center, 1994). See also BARBARA S.
MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DIsTRIcr COURTS (Fed. Jud. Center,
1990). As part of the research for this lecture, I surveyed the eight federal districts in which
voluntary arbitration programs are currently ongoing. According to the information provided,
in five of the eight programs, parties may select their own arbitrators; four rely on a single
arbitrator while two offer a choice between use of a single arbitrator, or a three person panel.
The data provided by Rauma and Kratka summarize the programs somewhat differently,
illustrating the difficulties of capturing dynamic programs. RAUMA & KRAFKA supra at 10-11,
Table 2.
34 Arbitration under some systems includes the issuance of awards in writing, with a
summary of issues. See, for example, the description of the New York Stock Exchange Guide
on arbitration, as set forth in Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-32
(1991). See also 2 CCH New York Stock Exchange Guide 4311-4327, Rule 627(e)-(f) (1992).
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trials," information comes either from witnesses or with arguments by
lawyers or litigants.3 5
A third form of ADR moves further away from formal modes of
information development. Conversation (sometimes called mediation,
sometimes called a conference, sometimes called evaluation) is employed to
elicit agreement by the parties. Judge-run settlement conferences are an
example of this genre of ADR, as are "early neutral evaluations"
("ENE"). 36 In this form of ADR, the relationship between information and
outcome may be obscure, in part by virtue of the absence of formal
articulation by the third party of its views of the respective positions of the
disputants. Reaching agreement is one goal, as is the narrowing of the
dispute, should further proceedings or adjudication be needed. When
settlements take place, it is because of parties' consent, which may or may
not track their legal rights.37
35 See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial: An Effective Aid to Settlement, 77
JUDICATURE 6 (1993). Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation:
Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTGERS L. Rnv. 253, 271 (1985) (discussing mini-trials; when Chief Judge of the Northern
District of California, Judge Peckham was an early and vocal advocate of judicial
management and ADR in general).
36 David I. Levine, Northern District of California Adopts Early Neutral Evaluation to
Expedite Dispute Resolution, 72 JUDICrATURE 235 (1989) (describing ENE and its
implementation); William D. Underwood, Divergence In the Age of Cost and Delay
Reduction: The Texas Experience With Federal Civil Justice Reform, 25 TaX. TtcH L. REv.
261, 311-12 (1994) (describing ENE).
37 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter: A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991) (undertaking an empirical study of
settlements of securities class actions and concluding that settlements were achieved by virtue
of incentive structures not tightly linked to the legal and factual merits of the cases). But see
Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARv. L. Rnv. 438, 453, 457 (1994) (arguing that
Alexander's study relies on a "statistical[ily] insignificant ... small sample"; and that
"authentic data" about the role of private litigation in securities law enforcement is insufficient
to support curbing such cases). A vivid example of a settlement expressly detached from
legal right comes from Judge Jack Weinstein's work in the Agent Orange litigation. His
efforts produced a $180 million settlement for the class, which he then approved. In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Pinkney v. Dow Chem. Co., 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
Thereafter, Judge Weinstein dismissed the claims of those who had "opted out" - on the
grounds that these individuals had no legal claim, that as far as he could then tell, dioxin did
not cause their injury. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1229
(E.D. N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v.
Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988) ("[The] most serious deficiency in plaintiffs' case is
220
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Some commentators have attempted to limit the use of the term ADR
and resist its application. For some, settlement programs or judicial
management are not properly classified as ADR; for others, criteria are
imposed to qualify a program as ADR. 38 The impulse to constrain the
vocabulary stems from a variety of concerns, including that too much is
being packaged as ADR, confusing the analysis, and that certain forms of
intervention, such as judicial engagement with the parties to search for
settlement, would be better described as "creative judicial management"
("CJM") or settlement efforts, and separately considered, rather than
subsumed within the ADR framework.
The effort to peel settlement programs away from ADR is, in my view,
hard to sustain. Settlement remains a central purpose of many forms of
ADR, including those not styled "settlement conferences." 39 Even those
forms of ADR closely resembling adjudication, such as court-annexed
arbitration, rely on parties' acceptance of the outcomes (a form of
settlement) rather than parties' insistence on adjudication. Moreover, many
within the legal community include settlement efforts as part of their own
descriptions of the reasons for ADR,40 or link various forms of ADR to
their failure to present credible evidence of a causal link between exposure to Agent Orange
and the various diseases from which they are allegedly suffering.").
3 8 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full? A Glass Half Empty: The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 U. TEx. L. REv.
(forthcoming, 1995) (reserving "the term ADR for procedures for resolving disputes in
litigation that, compared to the traditional litigation processes of adversarial negotiation,
settlement, and trial, enhance parties' control over litigation outcomes or process.")
(emphasis in original); Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Courts, 76 IowA L. REv. 889, 897-98 (1991) (while ADR has "many connotations," limiting
her discussion to "court-annexed arbitration, summary jury trials, mediation, and early neutral
evaluation").
39 See Garth, supra note 11, at 369 (discussing the "various artifices designed to
promote settlements" and "increased judicial activism to compel parties to reach a settlement"
as well as court-annexed arbitration, early neutral evaluation, mini and summary jury trials,
economic settlement incentives, and malpractice mediation). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 16,
Advisory Committee's Note to the 1993 revisions ("Even if a case cannot immediately be
settled, the judge and attorneys can explore possible use of alternative procedures, such as
mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration that
can lead to consensual resolution of the dispute without a full trial on the merits.").
40 See, e.g., District of Massachusetts, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Local Rule 16.4
(adopted, Nov. 18, 1991) (discussing mandatory settlement conferences as well as "other
alternative dispute resolution programs"); Memorandum of Susan Keilitz, State Justice
Institute, on "State Justice Institute Grant List," (Mar. 21, 1994) (listing "Alternative Dispute
Resolution Projects" funded: "Judicial Settlement: development of a New Course Module,
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court management and settlement. 41 Hence, the discussion that follows
considers settlement programs as a species of ADR.
The concern about the way in which an overflowing "ADR basket" can
make mushy an analysis is a different kind of criticism, one well taken in
many contexts. Were this essay an inquiry into the quality of outcomes or
processes of ADR, it would be necessary to consider each form individually
and not to speak of ADR as a "generic." However, my interest here is in
the relationship between ADR in its generic form, as an idea of an
alternative regime (much as Professor Sander sought) to state-based
adjudication. Because the legal establishment's promotion of the variety of
forms of ADR has generally been as a package, it is appropriate within the
confines of this lecture to consider ADR as an undifferentiated set of
processes.
IV. THE CONTOURS OF THE NEw FRAMEWORK
Over the past decades, the proposals for ADR have turned-with the
assistance of many federal and state judges-into law. Below, I delineate
some of the ways in which ADR has become "legalized" and
institutionalized. As I develop the discussion of the "law of ADR," I will
also begin my discussion of the attitudes toward and claims made about the
nature and quality of both alternative dispute resolution and adjudication.
A. Supreme Court Doctrine: Revising Rules on the Legality of
Contracts to Arbitrate
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, separated by almost three
decades, offer a first set of comparisons. The context is court enforcement
of contracts to arbitrate disputes, involving federal statutory rights, outside
Film and Instrument Manual," "Analysis of the Civil Settlement Process," and "Judicial
Settlement" (on file with Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution)). See generally Robert J.
MacCoun, E. Allen Lind & Tom R. Tyler, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Trial and
Appellate Courts, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCH. & L. 95 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds.,
1992) (reviewing research on "several major court-administered ADR procedures," including
"fee-shifting rules, small claims mediation, victim-offender mediation, judicially mediated
plea bargaining, judicial settlement conferences, court-annexed arbitration, and summary jury
trials.").
41 See, e.g., Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The
Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 239 & n.3 (1987) (acknowledging the
"warrant for equating settlement and ADR" as well as the distinctive means by which ADR
"devices differ in how they relate to settlement").
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the courts.42 My subsequent discussion is about alternative dispute
resolution within the courts. While that distinction is important in terms of
legal doctrine, the changes in the Supreme Court's descriptions of the
function of both private alternatives to adjudication and adjudication itself
provide insight into the legal establishment's contemporary acceptance of
court-based ADR.
In 1953, in Wilko v. Swan,43 the United States Supreme Court held that
a customer of a brokerage firm who claimed he had been fraudulently
"induced" to buy stock44 had a right to litigate a claim of violation of the
Securities Act of 1933, notwithstanding that the customer had signed a
contract to arbitrate future disputes. The Court rested its decision on an
interpretation of Congress-that the Securities Act itself precluded such
agreements. 45
Two concerns influenced this reading of the securities statute in Justice
Reed's opinion for the Court. The first was the Court's fear of arbitrators'
potential arbitrariness: that unlike a person who bore the name "judge,"' an
arbitrator was potentially lawless. While an arbitrator might, at some level,
be governed by law, the arbitration itself was not a process obliged to
enforce federal law.46 The trial court in Wilko had used the phrase
"looser approximations" of rights47 to capture this concern.
42 In addition to the discussion above, about the arbitrability of federal statutory claims,
another line of cases considers the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act and its relationship to
state law. Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated its position that the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947), preempts state arbitration law (invalidating a predispute arbitration
contract) when a contract "evidenc[es] a transaction affecting interstate commerce," and does
not turn on whether the parties to the contract "'contemplated' an interstate commerce
connection." Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 837 (1995) (citing 9
U.S.C. § 2 and reaffirming Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)). Consistent with
its current view that arbitration of federal statutory claims is favored, see infra notes 52-63
and accompanying text, the Court stated in Allfed-Bruce that "the purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate." Id. at 838.
43 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
44 Id. at 429.
4 5 Justice Jackson concurred to explain that in his view, the Act did not prohibit
arbitration agreements that were entered into after the controversy arose. Id. at 438-39.
46 The majority did not explicitly agree with the lower court that an arbitrator's award
could be vacated for failure to comport with the Securities Act and further noted the
difficulties of ascertaining that such a failure had occurred. Ld. at 436. Compare Wtlko v.
Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953). In contrast, dissenting Justices Frankfurter and
Minton argued that "[a]rbitrators may not disregard the law." Wiko, 346 U.S. at 440.
47 Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 78 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) (quoting American Almond
Prods. Co. v. Consolodated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944)).
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A second concern that animated the Court's refusal to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate was anxiety about the adequacy of negotiations
between parties. The Court noted that, while courts and legislatures might
find arbitration a reasonable mode of dispute resolution, parties could be
coerced into turning to arbitration; as a consequence, the "validity" of the
agreement to arbitrate was in issue.48 Justice Reed spoke of the "surrender"
of rights and of the "advantages" provided by federal law. In the Court's
view, a security buyer's "surrender"-prior to a claimed violation-would
necessarily have been made at a time when the buyer was "less able to judge
the weight of the handicap" of ceding a place in the litigation queue than
would the adversary, the brokerage firm. 49
Three assumptions, central to Wiko, were key to its intellectual
framework. First, arbitration was assumed to be something different from
and less loyal to law than adjudication. Second, public judgments rendered
by federal trial courts on factual questions, such as the claim of fraudulent
inducement of a client by a firm to purchase stock, in individual cases, were
viewed as desirable mechanisms of social regulation. Third, the judiciary
viewed with skepticism the agreements of parties; parties' agreements were
insufflcient, in and of themselves, to valorize all the decisions embodied in
those agreements.
For almost thirty years, these assumptions formed something called a
"public policy" objection to arbitration of federal statutory claims-an
objection that became embedded in the case law and that moved from the
securities context to the antitrust context and then to other federal statutory
regimes. The arbitrator as dispute resolver was posited as a potential hazard
to the state, as lawmaker. As a consequence, when litigants sought to avoid
agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims, they were able to persuade
judges of the necessity of permitting adjudication-not arbitration-to
ensure that principles of federal law would guide the outcome of the
dispute.50 Implementation of this position took two forms; one approach
permitted litigants to avoid the arbitration itself, while another permitted
litigants who had been to arbitration to avoid the preclusive effect of those
decisions and to litigate federal statutory claims. 51
During the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court changed its mind. The
Court, once again describing itself as interpreting congressional intent,
reached a different understanding of that intent. On rereading, it turned out
48 Wiko, 346 U.S. at 432.
4 9 
Id at 427.
5 0 MACNEIL, supra note 2, at 63-64. Several essays in law reviews recount this
approach, including Stewart Sterk's Enforceability ofAgreements to Arbitrate, An Examina'on
of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 481 (1981).
51 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
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that Congress was for, rather than against, arbitration in the context of
federal regulatory regimes. Initially, Wilko was narrowed; in Justice
O'Connor's words, it was to be read as "barring waiver of a judicial forum
only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights."5 2
Then, Wilko was flatly overruled. 53 Public policy no longer prohibits
arbitration; rather, public policy welcomes arbitration of federal statutory
claims.
Along the path of this doctrinal shift, the three assumptions embodied
in Wilko were revised as well. Recall the first, a view of arbitration as
different from adjudication and potentially lawless. From the vantage point
of the 1980s, the prior generation's emphasis of difference was cast in a
negative light, as "suspicious" and "mistrust[fil],"54 and properly to be
replaced with a "healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration."55 The current assumption is that arbitration is sufficiently
similar to adjudication so as to serve as its equal. "Arbitral tribunals" (as
they came to be named) are, now lauded for their capacity to handle
"complexities," such as antitrust law. 56 Moreover, attributes of arbitration
(its relative informality, its reduced use of discovery, its disinterest in
precedent) that were formerly perceived to be undesirable became the very
elements now lauded as "streamlined," 57  "flexible," "prompt", and
5 2 Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 220 (1987) (relying on
the Court's 1975 holding, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), which had
upheld the enforcement of an arbitration agreement that had been entered into as a part of an
international contract before the dispute arose and that involved a claim under the Exchange
Act).
5 3 The cases typically cited as the route by which the Wiko doctrine met its demise are
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991). Professor MacNeil also links the Supreme Court's ruling in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) to these cases, for in upholding the arbitrability of a claim under
state franchise law, the Court implicitly weakened the prohibition on arbitration of
legislatively created rights. See MacNeil, supra note 2, at 73-77.
54 Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 231, 233. See also Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at
480 (describing Wtlko as illustrative of Judge Jerome Frank's comment about "the old judicial
hostility to arbitration" from Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d
978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
5 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
56 Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 232.
57 Id.
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"efficient". 58 The tone in some contemporary opinions is that opponents or
skeptics of arbitration are outmoded, "far out of step" with current
thinking. 59
The second assumption that Wiko exemplified was that adjudication
was a mechanism for regulation and rights pronouncement. This assumption
has also been revised. No longer are the regulatory goals of the state of
paramount interest in adjudication. "[Important incidental policing
function[s]" take a back seat to the goal of responding to individual claims
of the need for compensation. 60 Arbitration and adjudication are again
equated: both are interested in the resolution of individual disputes and,
with such resolution, both "further broader social purposes. "61
And finally, no longer are parties' agreements to arbitrate to be
scrutinized by the courts, nervous about inequality of bargaining and
suspicious of "surrender." Rather, once having made a bargain, the parties
"will be held to their bargain." 62 "Mere inequality in bargaining power"
does not often undermine the agreements forged. 63
58 "Although [arbitration] procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal courts,
by agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration'." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
31 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
5 9 Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481. See also Hearings on H.R. 1102, supra note 10
(Statement of Judge Jerome B. Simandle of the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, that while critical views of court-annexed arbitration "persist among a few
academics and traditionalist judges;" these are "[aibstract assertions" and "artificial critiques
that ignore experience.").
6 0 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 635 (anti-trust claims); ShearsonAmerican Express, 482 U.S.
at 240 (RICO claims).
61 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28. In addition, the Court noted the availability of settlement in
litigation as support for the proposition that adjudication is, like arbitration, aimed at dispute
resolution. Id. at 32. Given this approach, Stewart Sterk's definition, in 1981, of when a
public policy rationale should prevent arbitration works nicely; he argued that public policy
forbid arbitration only when "at issue is a legislative expression or a basic case law principle
designed for some purpose other than to foster justice between the parties to the dispute."
Sterk, supra note 50, at 483. Under current interpretations, the governing purpose of statutory
and judicial legal regimes is "to foster justice between the parties in dispute."
62 ShearsonlAmerican Express, 482 U.S. at 242; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
63 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. Of course, questions about specific agreements to arbitrate
remain litigated in both federal and state courts and are forming the basis of critical
commentary. One set of cases continues to explore themes of contracts of adhesion among
parties with disparate bargaining power. Compare Bell v. Congress Mortgage Co., 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 205 (Ct. App. 1994) (denying enforcement of contract to arbitrate between
refinancing homeowners and mortgage company) (depublished by the California Supreme
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Two changes have thus occurred over the last four decades. Intellectual
frameworks about the role of adjudication as a public regulatory process and
about the desirability of the state's reliance on parties' bargains as
substitutes for adjudication have evolved. In addition, the descriptions of
the goals, purposes, and natures of both arbitration and adjudication have
changed. Arbitration is like adjudication because, under the revised model,
regulation of conduct is neither central to arbitration" nor to adjudication of
federal statutory rights. Arbitration becomes reconceived as a "tribunal"
process, and adjudication is redescribed as a dispute resolution process,
designed to bring closure to individuals' conflicts. 65
Court, July 28, 1994), with Badie v. Bank of Am., 1994 WL 660730 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1994) (rejecting an injunction against the bank's policy of requiring arbitration for
disputes between the bank and its account holders and credit card recipients). See also
Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 1994 WL 701315, at *2-3 (9th Cir. 1994) (given
Congress' concern about "gross 'disparity of bargaining power' between franchisors and
franchisees and that a particular arbitration clause required "surrender" of statutory rights to
recover exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and statute of limitation protections, court
invalidated arbitration clause).
Another group of cases relates to the validity of arbitration clauses in applications to
register as a broker with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). The Ninth
Circuit found that a form's failure to "describe [the] disputes the parties agreed to arbitrate"
and the specific failure to inform signatories of the waiver of one's right to litigation in
"sexual discrimination suits" invalidated the agreement to arbitrate. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai,
42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994). In contrast, the Tenth Circuit recently upheld such an
agreement. Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir.
1994). See also Barbara Presley Noble, Attacking Compulsory Arbitration, N.Y. TiMES, Jan.
15, 1995, at P21 (lawsuit filed by former employee within securities industry challenges the
requirement of arbitrating work-related claims).
An additional concern (in the context of general arbitration law) is about the power of
arbitrators and the level of deference accorded their decisions. See, e.g., Advanced Micro
Devices v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 999-1000 (Cal. 1994) (requiring judicial deference "to
an arbitrator's finding that determination of a particular question is within the scope of his or
her contractual authority" to promote "the general rule of arbitral finality").
64 See Edward M. Morgan, Contract 7heory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to
the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1059 (1987) (discussing Supreme Court
arbitration decisions as prizing party autonomy over state objectives external to those parties).
65 See also Kanowitz, supra note 41, at 258-69 (rejecting a "public/private" or
"interests/rights" distinction and arguing that agreements to arbitrate can serve both sets of
interests and that public interests are not themselves unitary). A less cheerful convergence
between the two may be emerging: both arbitration and adjudication can be consumptive of
resources. See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, 885 P.2d at 998. (arbitration "lasted four and
one-half years and included three hundred and fifty-five days of hearings."); Margaret A.
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Watching case law doctrinal revisions (detailed above) and parallel
shifts in statutes, rules, and procedures (to which I turn below) enables
insight into underlying ideologies, of the role of and the rule of law, of
theories of the meaning and import of parties' consent, and of the function,
nature, and identity of courts. Of course, the changes are not smooth, and
not without protest 66 and complexity. 67 I turn now to other developments
Jacobs, Intel-Advanced Micro Case Stirs Debate Over Arbitrator's Powers, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 1995, at B7 (Intel and Advanced Micro Devices each spent over $100 million in legal fees
during the arbitration).
66 For example, in the context of arbitration doctrine, Justice Blackmun (joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall) dissented. As he put it (in the context of the Securities Act):
"The Court ... approves the abandonment of the judiciary's role in the resolution of claims
under the Exchange Act and leaves such claims to the arbitral forum of the securities industry
at a time when the industry's abuses toward investors are more apparent than ever."
ShearsonAmerican Express, 482 U.S. at 243 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Members of Congress have also responded to the judicial approval of arbitration.
Representative John Bryant (a Democrat from Texas) introduced a bill to amend the Federal
Arbitration Act to permit parties to a "sales and service contract" to reject arbitration at the
time a dispute arises. Further, the proposed legislation would have compelled arbitrators to
write decisions that would in turn have been subjected to judicial scrutiny upon a finding that
the law was "disregarded." See The Voluntary Arbitration Act of 1993, H.R. 1314, 103d
Cong. § 17 (Mar. 11, 1993).
67 In addition to questions of adhesive contracts to arbitrate (see supra note 63), a
second set of concerns focuses on the problems of litigation of employment discrimination
disputes. See U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED
REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DIScRimINATION DIsPuTEs, GAO/HEHS-94-17 (March 1994)
(discussing a lack of oversight of arbitrators and of rules, by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, of discrimination cases filed in the securities industry); Williams v. Katten,
Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding enforceable a law partnership
agreement to arbitrate federal employment discrimination claims); Steven A. Holmes, Some
Employees Lose Right to Sue for Bias at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at A4.
A related issue is whether an arbitration precludes subsequent civil rights litigation.
Some courts continue to cite McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984), and
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), for the proposition that federal
statutory civil rights claims are not precluded by prior arbitrations. See, e.g., Sutton v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 F.2d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1992) (§ 1983 rights can be asserted
without regard to contractual arbitration obligation). Compare Bender v. A.G. Edwards and
Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (Title VII claims can now be subjected to
compulsory arbitration). See also Farrel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l. Trade Comm'n, 949 F.2d 1147
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that agreements to arbitrate do not preclude administrative agencies
from investigating complaints that have been subjected to arbitration). For proposals to
exempt Title VII from the reach of Gilmer, see the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of
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over the past four decades that need to be read alongside the revised view of
private agreements to arbitrate rather than adjudicate federal statutory
rights.
/
B. The Judiciary at Work: Judicial Management, Court-Annexed
ADR, and the Settlement of Cases
To many "raised in the law" since the 1980s, it may seem ordinary
that, as a part of their daily work, judges manage cases, encourage
settlement, and urge parties to use various forms of ADR, from judicial
settlement conferences to court-annexed arbitration. Thus, I need to
underscore that the enthusiasm on the part of the judiciary and the vocal
support of these forms of the judicial role are relatively recent phenomena.
By way of comparison, consider an essay written only forty years ago by
two well-known United States professors, Ben Kaplan and Arthur Van
Mehren. 68 Returning from Germany in 1958, they described to a United
States readership of lawyers, judges, and law professors how different
German judges were from those in the United States. Consider the
description of the foreign-German--judge. He was "constantly descending
to the level of the litigants, as an examiner, patient or hectoring, as
counselor and advisor, [and] as insistent promotor of settlements. "69
Just forty years have passed, but now that description is apt for the
United States federal trial judge as well. The change came about at first
rather informally. In the 1950s and 1960s, judges, court administrators, and
commentators extolled-particularly in large ("protracted") cases-the
virtues of case management and judicial assistance in settling cases. 70 In the
1994, S. 2045, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (under which "powers and procedures" in Title
VII could not be waived prospectively).
A third question is the relationship between federal mandates to arbitrate and state
statutory rights. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994).
6 8 They were joined by a third co-author, Rudolf Shaefer, a German judge. Benjamin
Kaplan, Arthur T. Von Mehren, & Rudolf Shaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71
HARV. L. REv. 1193 (Part 1), 1443 (Part 11) (1958).
69 Id. at 1472.
70 See Alfred P. Murrah, Foreword to the Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted
Cases, 21 F.R.D., 395-96 (1957) (discussing the organization of the first seminar on
protracted cases); Resolutions Adopted at the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319,
614-15 (1958) ("The judge assigned should at the earliest moment take actual control of the
case...") (emphasis in original); Joseph A. Navarro & Jean G. Taylor, An Application of
Systems Analysis to Aid in the Efficient Administration of Justice, 51 JUDICATURE 47 (1967);
William T. Becker, Efficient Use of Judicial Resources, 43 F.R.D. 421 (1967); Herbert L.
Will, Robert Merhige & Alvin Robin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75
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1970s, Frank Sander's theme of alternative dispute resolution emerged. By
1983, judicial engagement with these alternatives was institutionalized in
amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 which as
written in the 1930s, had provided a trial court with discretion to convene a
pretrial conference. 72 In contrast, the 1983 amendments required judges to
schedule pretrial conferences. The topics to be addressed included "the
possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute." 73
A decade later, in 1993, Rule 16 was again amended, to detail further
the judicial role in managing the pretrial process, controlling discovery,
structuring trials, and helping parties to settle cases. By these revisions,
judges were authorized to require parties or their representatives to be at
conferences or available by phone "to consider possible settlement of the
dispute. "74 Moreover, the 1993 amendments revised the description of
ADR (in 1983 termed "extrajudicial procedures") by describing it as
"special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by
statute or local rule."75 ADR thus moved inside the courts.
The national federal rules are not the only source of guidance for
district judges, nor the only means by which to measure change. Local
rulemaking and informal innovation are both important sources of
procedural alterations. Local rulemaking is a robust enterprise, in which
F.R.D. 203 (1977). See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAv. L. REV. 374
(1982). See also Marc Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DisP. REsOL. 55, 56-57
(citing judicial speeches from the 1970s that praise settlement).
71 Supreme Court of the United States, Order Promulgating Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 201-13 (Apr. 28, 1983).
72 "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to
appear before it for a conference to consider ... the simplification of the issues; ...
[amending] the pleadings; ... obtaining admissions of fact ... ; limit[ing] ... expert
witnesses; the advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings... ;
such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." HARRY GRAHAM BALTER,
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: ANALYZED AND ANNOTATED 40 (Parker & Baird,
1938) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16).
73 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (1983). Rule 16 (a)(5) includes "facilitating the settlement of
the case" as one of the possible objectives of the pretrial conference.
74 See United States Supreme Court, [Promulgated] Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 427-31 (effective Dec. 1, 1993) (Rule 16(c)).
75 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (1983) with FED. R. CIv. P. 16 (c)(9) (1993). The
1993 Advisory Committee's note explains that the revision "describe[s] more accurately"
procedures aside from "traditional settlement conferences" that "may be helpful in settling
litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(a) (1993) (Advisory Committee's note).
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districts detail a myriad of rules. 76 Evidence of the enthusiastic response in
some districts to the judicial settlement role can be found in these local
rules. For example, the District of Massachusetts requires that: "[a]t every
conference conducted under these rules, the judicial officer shall inquire as
to the utility of the parties conducting settlement negotiations, explore
means of facilitating those negotiations, and offer whatever assistance that
may be appropriate in the circumstances." 77
While local rulemaking captures ADR efforts in various districts, case
law is also a place in which to find ADR, particularly in large scale
litigation. From that genre of cases, one learns that ADR is not only a
feature of the pretrial process; some forms of ADR are also elements of
remedial provisions in large scale cases. Judges have approved the
incorporation of ADR in many of the "claims facilities" created as a part of
settlements of cases such as those involving the Dalkon Shield, Agent
Orange, and asbestos. 78
The changes over the past fifteen years in Rule 16 mark the alteration
7 6 Those rules are authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 and further encouraged in light of
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482, discussed infra notes 96-97 and
accompanying text. As of the late 1980s, local rulemaking had resulted in more than 5000
local rules, many of which varied in significant respects from the national set. See Leo Levin,
Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1567,
1570 (1991); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989).
7 7 District of Mass., Expense and Delay Reduction Plan, Article IV, Rule 4.02, D.
Mass. Local Rule 16.4(B) (rules adopted Nov. 18, 1991) (emphasis added). The rule also
notes that the judge assigned to the case (and who would preside at trial, if one occurred) may
refer a case to another district or to a magistrate judge to conduct settlement conferences. In
addition, and anticipating the revisions of the national rule, the Massachusetts local rule states
that "whenever a settlement conference is held, a representative of each party who has
settlement authority shall attend or be available by telephone." Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)
as amended by the 1993 amendments ("If appropriate, the court may require that a party or its
representative be present or reasonably available by telephone in order to consider possible
settlement of the dispute.").
78 See Symposium, C/alms Resolution Facilities and the Mass Settlement of Mass Torts,
53 L. & CoNTEmp. PRoBs. I (Francis E. McGovern ed., 1990). See also Peggy McCollum,
Dalkon Shield Claims Resolution Facility: A Contraceptive for Corporate Irresponsibility? 7
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RusOL. 351 (1992) (criticizing the facility for its secrecy). Compare
Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found?), 61
FORDIHAM L. REV. 617 (1992) (explaining, as the Trust's Chair, its procedures and
responding to criticism). For concern that many of the so-called ADR programs are really not
procedures aimed at enhancing litigant participation, see Hensler, supra note 38.
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of the judicial role. Although not all judges are enthusiasts, 79 many vocal
jurists are pressing for expanding authority over the pretrial process and
increased opportunities for alternative resolution methods.80 Some judges
have become identified as proponents of particular forms of ADR. Judges
such as the Honorable Raymond Broderick of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Thomas Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio, Arthur
Spiegel of the Southern District of Ohio, and Richard Enslen of the Western
District of Michigan, have expressed their appreciation for processes such
as summary jury trials and court-annexed arbitration, both of which rely on
the introduction of non-judge third parties, to respond to the development of
factual or legal information.81 Other judges are eager to expand the role of
the judge as mediator. Wayne Brazil, Federal Magistrate Judge in the
Northern District of California, offers guidance on how to conduct
settlement conferences, 82 and Charles Richey, Federal District Judge in the
79 See, e.g., G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Visions, Differing Values: A Comment on
Judge Parker's Reformation Model for Federal District Courts, 46 SMU L. Rnv. 1935 (1993)
(Special Edition: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Procedural Justice). In addition, some
judges call for reforms not in management, but in adjudication itself. See, e.g., Roger J.
Miner, Federal Court Reform Should Start From the Top, 77 JUDICATURE 104 (1993) (arguing
that legal uncertainty is a major source of the caseload growth and that the Supreme Court has
played an unfortunate role in issuing opinions that are neither clear nor easy to follow).
80 See, e.g., Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Reformation
Model of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REv. 1905 (1993) (Special Edition: Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Procedural Justice); Lambros, supra note 35, at 7; Peckham, supra
note 35, at 255-60; Richard A. Enslen, ADR: Another Acronym or a Viable Alternative to the
High Cost of Litigation and Crowded Court Dockets? The Debate Commences, 18 N.M. L.
REV. 1, 3-6 (1988).
81 See Raymond J. Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72
JUDICATURE 217 (1989); Lambros, supra 35; Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789 (1989);
Honorable S. Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829 (1986). But see
Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986) (commenting on
the costs of summary jury trial and questioning the use of jurors).
82 WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECrIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1988); Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Settlement Conferences:
Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1 (1987). See also Michael
R. Hogan, Judicial Settlement Conferences: Empowering the Parties to Decide Through
Negotiation, 27 WILLAMETTE L.J. 429, 451-54 (1991) (Magistrate Judge Hogan of the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon, explaining his settlement techniques); D.
Marie Provine, Settlement Strategies for Federal District Judges (Fed. Jud. Center, 1986)
(data from interviews of federal trial judges exploring methods for encouraging settlement).
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District of Columbia, extols the utility of those conferences.8 3 Yet others,
such as Robert Parker (formerly of the Eastern District of Texas and now on
the Fifth Circuit), call for mandatory ADR, made part of the process early
in the life of a lawsuit.84 A student commentator captures some aspects of
these activities by entitling a law review essay: "Let's Make a Deal:
Effective Utilization of Judicial Settlements in State and Federal Courts."8
5
While a good deal of material thus documents judicial interest in ADR,
it is difficult to quantify both the embrace of ADR and the extent to which
practice has changed. A debate exists about whether the rhetoric of ADR
overshadows its employment. Professor Kim Dayton has argued that ADR
is a "myth," in that relatively few programs are in place in individual
districts, and relatively few cases are affected.8 6 Recent studies echo her
findings that not all federal courts have active ADR programs.8 7 Moreover,
Seminars are also offered to enhance judges' ability to resolve disputes. See, e.g., Institute for
Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine University School of Law, Judicial Mediation Skills (offered
June 9-11, 1994) (materials on file with Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution).
Despite such judicial enthusiasm, some question the utility of the effort. See, e.g., Marc
Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1388-89 (1994) (arguing that there is "no basis for
thinking judicial promotion leads to a number of settlements that is sufficiently higher than
would otherwise occur to compensate for the opportunity costs of the judicial attention
diverted from adjudication," and that "[w]e simply do not know if judicial intervention
improves the quality of settlements.").
83 Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited;- Reflections for the Benefit of Bench and Bar,
139 F.R.D. 525 (1991) (praising the court's enhanced authority under Rule 16).
84 Parker & Hagin, supra note 80, at 1913-14.
85 Wlliam L. Adams, Note, Let's Make a Deal: Effective Utifzation of Judicial
Settlements in State and Federal Courts, 72 ORE. L. Rav. 427 (1993).
86 Dayton, supra note 38, at 917-18 & n.165 (concluding from her 1978-88 research
that 11 of 94 districts could be classified as "ADR districts," defined as referring at least five
percent of their civil filings to ADR; also arguing that ADR implementation has been uneven
and that its ability to lower costs and increase the speed of resolution have not been
demonstrated). See also RAuMA & KRAFKA, supra note 33 (discussing range of ADR
programs in federal district courts); MEwRHOEFER, supra note 33 (same).
87 In 1995, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) will be publishing a sourcebook listing
ADR programs. According to FJC staff, about a third of the federal courts report having
mediation programs; almost all describe themselves as having settlement conferences.
Telephone interview with FJC staff member (Jan. 5, 1995). For discussion of the role of such
programs in federal courts, see Donna Stienstra & Thomas E. Willging, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Why They Do and Wy They Do Not Have a Place in the Federal Trial Courts,
(Fed. Jud. Center, forthcoming Spring, 1995) (manuscript on file with Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution). Contained therein is also information on the time judges devote to such
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if ADR is confined to a particular set of programs (such as excluding
judicial settlement efforts), then the spread of ADR is greater on paper than
in the federal courts. 88 Finally (and assuming judicial settlement efforts are
within the ADR rubric), a baseline problem exists: we cannot uncover what
federal trial judges thought to be the appropriate level of permissible
engagement in settlement negotiations or in urging ADR procedures during
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 89 or whether there even was a
shared approach.
But we do know that the rule structure for federal judges in 1938
neither discussed with any specificity nor urged trial judges to superintend
settlement negotiations and explore ADR. In 1994, settlement is part of the
federal trial judge's job description, and the mandate comes from rules
shaped by judges and lawyers 90 who have advocated such changes. As this
programs. See id. Table 2, Judge and Magistrate Time Reported for ADR and Settlement
Activities. See also RAUMA & KRAFKA, supra note 33 (not all districts eligible to have either
mandatory or voluntary nonbinding arbitration programs have such programs nor do high
levels of participation exist uniformly). In contrast to this discussion of the use of ADR, a
1994 report from district courts on their efforts to implement the Civil Justice Reform Act (see
infra note 96) indicated that 86 percent of the districts had "adopted authorization to refer
appropriate cases to various court designated alternative dispute resolution programs,
including mediation, mini-trial, and summary judgment." Civil Justice Reform Act Report
Submitted to Congress, 26 T1 THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1994, at 9.
88 According to a very preliminary review undertaken by Donna Stienstra of the Federal
Judicial Center, as of 1994, twenty federal district courts have authorized and/or use early
neutral evaluation programs; forty-nine use mediation programs; thirty-one have court-
annexed arbitration, eight have case valuation programs, and eight have settlement weeks.
Thirteen districts have no specific programs but general encouragement of ADR. Of the 94
districts, eleven had none of the above programs. Letter from Donna Stienstra, The Federal
Judicial Center, to Judith Resnik (Jan. 18, 1994) (noting limits of data that may provide an
oversimplified picture) (on file with Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution). These data
will be revised and reported when the FJC publishes its sourcebook on ADR in 1995.
Additional data will also become available when the Institute for Civil Justice of RAND
completes its review of the implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act (discussed infra
note 104), which authorizes ADR.
89 Recall MacNeil's caveat, supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also Galanter,
supra note 70, at 56-57 (arguing that judicial, admiration for settlements predates the "modem
ADR movement."). Compare Provine, supra note 82 (describing in 1986 "broad and
accelerating movement toward more judicial involvement in the settlement process").
90 See, e.g., Katrina M. Dewey, A White Kight to ADR's Rescue, CAL. L. Bus., Sept.
13, 1993, at 16 (describing Robert Raven, ABA president in 1988-89, who was active in
promoting ADR and institutionalizing ABA support for ADR). See also AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY 1993 (guide published annually);
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century ends, judges and lawyers debate less about whether ADR is good
and more about who should initiate ADR, who may attend, 91 and whether it
should be mandatory.92 The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court contrasts a "traditional view" of the federal courts with a model of
the "future federal courts as comprehensive justice centers, offering
consumers a whole menu of dispute resolution procedures." 93 ADR has
become a part of the judicial process and no longer stands a part from it.94
C. Congressional Promotion of ADR and ADR's Use in
Administrative Agencies
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are largely the work product of
the judiciary, acting through its special committees. These rules come into
being by virtue of congressional inaction.95 But Congress has not been
silent in the ADR conversation. Over the past few years, many members of
Congress have also voiced enthusiasm for ADR, and some of their views
have become part of legislation. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
reiterated by statute the aspiration that district courts use ADR. 96 This
Robert D. Raven, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Expanding Opportunities, 43 ARE. J., June
1988, at 44 ("ADR has truly come of age."); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 82, at 1342-46;
VAYNE D. BRAZL, SETTLNG CrriL Surrs: LITIGATORS' VIEws ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES
AND EFFEcrIvE TECHHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES (1985).
9 1 See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir.
1988) (permitting no right of access to summary jury trials). From the eight responses
received to my questionnaire addressed to federal courts with voluntary arbitration programs,
two districts reported that anyone could attend the proceedings (held in court rooms); three
reported that parties and/or the arbitrator decided; and three clerks reported not knowing. In
one of those districts, no arbitrations had yet been held, and the district's rules were silent on
the issue.
92 See In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993) (vacating trial court order obliging
summary jury trial participation); Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987)
(overturning a trial judge's mandate of parties to participate in summary jury trials); Lucy V.
Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism. Two-Headed Monster or
TWo Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 1.
93 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the
Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. Ray. 1, 8-9.
94 As Carroll Seron put it, "an adjudicatory model is no longer the sole center of...
court practice." Seron, The Impact of Court Organization on Litigation, 24 L. & Soc'Y Rsv.
451, 463 (1990). See also LINDA R. SINGER, SETrLVNo DIsPUTES: CoNucr RESOLUTION IN
BUSiNESs, FAM~mmS, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 165-68 (2d ed. 1994).
95 See The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990).
96 See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(3)(A), and (a)(6)(B) (1990), which call for the Advisory
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legislation is the major statement by Congress on civil processes of the last
decade. 97 Its stated purposes are to reduce delay and expense, and
alternatives to trial and adjudication are important aspects of the legislation.
A related piece of legislation is the Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1990 ("ADRA") 98 which requires each federal agency to "adopt a
policy that addresses the use of alternative means of dispute resolution and
case management."99 The act instructs agencies to consider using ADR at
all phases of their work, from rulemaking and enforcement actions to
agency adjudication.1 0 The ADRA is predicated upon congressional
"findings" of ADR's desirability. Congress believed ADR to be "faster,
less expensive, and less contentious," and that ADR could generate "more
creative, efficient, and sensible outcomes" than does "litigation in the
Federal courts."101 This legislation represents a "government wide
emphasis" on ADR. 102 Like ADR in the federal courts, programs existed in
Groups constituted under the CJRA to formulate civil justice expense and delay reduction
plans to consider, as basic principles, that judicial officers explore the "parties' receptivity to,
and the propriety of, settlement..." and that the plans authorize courts to "refer appropriate
cases to alternative dispute resolution programs." Further, much of the focus of the plan is
judicial control, management, settlement, and ADR. While the CJRA has relatively little focus
on adjudication, juries, and trials, a Task Force convened by Senator Biden developed what
became a first draft of the legislation; its report included more discussion of trials than did the
resulting legislation. See JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION
2, 9 (Brookings, 1989).
97 In 1988, Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act to ensure more public access and
information, but Pthose changes do not represent a major reformulation of the basic
framework. For discussion of ongoing congressional involvement in civil procedure over the
past two decades, see Judith Resnik, Civil Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: A Panel
Discussion, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1199, 1201-03 (1993) (including Margaret A. Berger,
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Ralph K. Winter, Deborah R. Hensler, Stephen N. Subrin, Elizabeth
M. Schneider, and Jeffrey W. Stempel).
98 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-593 (1990) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (1992)).
99 5 U.S.C. § 581 note (1990) (Promotion of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution
section (a)) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 571 (1992)).
1o0 5 U.S.C. § 581 note (1990) (Promotion of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution
section (a)(2)) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 571 (1992)).
101 5 U.S.C. § 581 note (1990) (Congressional Findings section (3)-(4)) (current version
at 5 U.S.C. § 571 (1992)).
102 S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3931, 3932 (June 1,
1990). For discussion of earlier efforts by agencies to rely on informal processes, see
Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal CiVil Rights
Enforcement, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 482 (1987). For discussion of agency adjudicative
problems, see Alan W. Heifetz, ALTS, ADR, and ADP: The Future of Admnistrative
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agencies before legislation authorized their use. 103 Like ADR in the courts,
commentators report uneven implementation, 104 but the aspiration for
expansive use remains strong. 105
ADR within the courts remains on the congressional agenda. In 1993
and 1994, some members of Congress urged mandating that each district
court provide court-annexed arbitration programs. 10 6  The Judicial
Adjudication, 1 WIDENERJ. PuB. L. 13 (1992).
103 See Bernard V. Parrette, The Contract Disputes Act and the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act: A Richness of Remedies, Finally Ready for Trial? 20 PuB. CONT. L.J. 293
(1991) ("[A]Il ADR methods, including the equivalent of binding arbitration, have been
available in the public contract sector" in Board of Contract Appeals "for some time."). See
generally ADMINuSTRATvE CONFERENCE oF THE UNITED STATES, SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL
AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1987).
104 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National Performance Review's
Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 DUKE L.J. 1165, 1174 (1994). For discussion of
how to evaluate the programs instituted, see ELIZABETH RoLPH & ERiK MOLLER,
EVALUATING AGENCY ADR PROGRAMS: A USER'S GUIDE TO DATA COLLECTION AND USE
(ICJ, RAND, forthcoming, 1995) (manuscript on file with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute
Resolution).
105 Lubbers, supra note 104, at 1174 (urging expanded reliance on ADR). There is
some irony to the sense that agency decision making is in need of revision. In the 1940s,
agencies were promoted as a desperately needed alternative to adjudication. See, e.g., Samuel
1. Rosenman, Public Papers and Addresses ofFranklin D. Roosevelt, 9 PUB. PAPERS 616-18
(1941) (when vetoing the "Bill Regulating Administrative Agencies," Roosevelt described
court procedures as costly and over technical, and agencies as providing simple, informal, and
less rigid alternatives).
Now, in the 1990s, the view is that ADR is needed for agencies. Proponents of these
changes have also noted that agencies were to be the expeditious alternative to adjudication.
See Hearings on H.R. 2497 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1990) (Statement of Dan Glickman,
Democrat from Kansas) [hereinafter Glickman Statement]; Hearings on H.R. 2497 Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 91
(1990) (Statement of Philip J. Harter on behalf of the American Bar Association). See also
Senator Charles E. Grassley and Charles Pou, Jr., Congress, the Executive Branch and the
Dispute Resolution Process, 1992 J. DIsP. RSOL. 1, 12 (Agencies have "gradually ossified,
transformed from a 'cure' to being part of the problem.").
106 One version of the Court Arbitration Authorization Act of 1993, H.R. 1102, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 12, 1993) would have amended 28 U.S.C. § 651(a) to state that "Each
United States district court shall authorize by local role the use of arbitration in civil actions,
including adversary proceedings in bankruptcy ..... Cases eligible would have included
those with amounts in controversy up to $150,000. As Representative William J. Hughes of
New Jersey subsequently explained, in his view, "mandatory programs were far more
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Conference of the United States objected and argued that such programs
should be optional with district courts.10 7 A second issue is not whether to
mandate that courts offer such programs but whether, if such programs
exist, to mandate that litigants whose cases qualify be required to use court-
annexed arbitration before being permitted to return to the "traditional"
adjudicatory mode. 0 8 Congress's current, interim response has been to
continue the authorization of twenty districts, ten of which may only
provide voluntary non-binding court-annexed arbitration and ten of which
may, at their option, mandate participation in such programs. Congress has
thus accommodated the judiciary's concerns and reauthorized the current
court-annexed programs without requiring that all districts put such
activities into place.' 09
successful than the voluntary programs." 140 CONG. REc. E 14 (daily ed., Jan. 25, 1994).
See infra note 107 on the subsequent course of the legislation.
1 07 Key Legislative Initiatives Advance in Congress, 25 THE TMRD BRANcH, Oct. 1993,
at 3, 5. The proposed provisions to mandate that district courts have arbitration programs
were promptly amended to make such programs optional with the district courts. See the
Court Arbitration Authorization Act of 1993, H.R. 1102, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 13,
1993). A summary of objections to a congressional mandate of arbitration in every district can
be found at 139 CONG. REc. S 16573 (daily ed., Nov. 19, 1993) (statements of Senator
Heflin).
The ABA also objected. Responding to H.R. 1102 in its August 1994 meeting, the
ABA's House of Delegates "voted loudly by voice to condemn mandatory arbitration for any
class of claims in federal court." ABA Seeks lawyer Input on Rules Drafting, Nixes Mandatory
Court-Annexed Arbitration, 63 U.S.L.W. 2097, 2098 (Aug. 16, 1994).
The Senate did not pass companion legislation to the House's 1993 bill, but then
approved an extension of the extant programs. See S. 1732, A Bill to Authorize Pilot Court-
Annexed Arbitration for Another Year (Nov. 19, 1993). The House thereafter enacted
comparable legislation, 139 CONG. REc. H 10975 (daily ed., Nov. 22, 1993), and the
extension became law on December 14, 1993. 139 CONG. REc. D 1395 (daily ed., Dec. 14,
1993). In 1994, Senator Heflin introduced S. 2524, the Voluntary Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1994, that proposed permitting (not requiring) districts to adopt voluntary
court-annexed arbitration programs, with no penalties for litigants exercising their rights to
trial de novo. S. 2524, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 6, 1994).
108 See, e.g., Statement by Representative Hughes, supra note 106; Katz, supra note
92.
109 See the Judicial Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-192, 107 Stat. 2292 (1993),
amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 to extend the date of expiration of the authorization for court-
annexed arbitration programs from November of 1993 until December 31, 1994; Judicial
Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, 108 Stat. 4343 (Oct. 24, 1994), extending
authorization until 1997.
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D. The Executive and ADR
Civil justice reform efforts have also been the focus of the Executive
branch. The Bush Administration promulgated an Executive Order 110 that
required government attorneys to seek to settle cases. That Executive Order
also called for increased use of ADR. 111 Although there is dispute about
both what animated the Executive's interest in this area 1 2 and the degree to
which the Executive actually committed itself by this Order to do anything
specific, there is no question about the Executive's rhetorical posture, which
joined its co-branches of government in praising ADR. Members of the
Clinton Administration have also adopted a pro-ADR stance. Vice President
Al Gore's report, Creating a Government that Works Better & Costs Less:
Improving Regulatory Systems, 113 acknowledged the propriety of litigation
at times, but also praised alternatives as sometimes generating "better
results than might otherwise occur."1 14
E. The Legalization and Institutionalization of ADR
Let me pause to summarize. In 1976, Frank Sander called for more
modalities of dispute resolution-based in the courts. His call has been more
than heard; it has become law. Via legislation, national and local rule
making, and executive proclamation, every branch of the federal
110 Exec. Order No. 12778 (Oct. 23, 1991), 56 Fed. Reg. 55195 (1991).
II The Order required such involvement only upon the government concluding that
such use would lead to a "prompt, fair, and efficient resolution." See Memorandum of
Preliminary Guidance on Implementation of the Litigation Reforms of Executive Order No.
12778, Office of Att'y Gen., 57 Fed. Reg. 3640, 3641 (Jan. 30, 1992).
112 Compare Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The
Council on Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 250 (1992)
(criticizing the "empirical underpinnings" as "shaky" and that proposals are aimed at
"chang[mg] the current balance between individual plaintiffs and corporate defendants, in
favor of the latter. That agenda is a political one... .") with Gregory B. Butler & Brian D.
Miller, Fiddling IWle Rome Burns: A Response to Dr. Hensler, 75 JUDICATURE 251, 254
(1992) (stating that reforms will "reduce the burden of excessive, needless litigation"). See
also Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in
Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. Rnv. 659, 687-88 (1993)
(describing the efforts of then Vice President Dan Quayle to press for reforms in civil
litigation).
113 (Office of the Vice President, Sept. 1993) (Accompanying Report of the National
Performance Review).
114 Id. at 47-48. See also Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 59 Fed. Reg. 30368
Dep't of Interior, Off. of Sec. (June 13, 1994) (explaining notice of interim ADR policy).
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government has signalled its support of ADR. While the pattern of
implementation is varied1 15 and the discussion of it encompasses a range of
procedures, approval in theory of ADR has become commonplace. 116
The current legal issues are not whether ADR is a desirable mode for
courts and agencies to adopt or whether courts should play a role in
encouraging parties to settle and to explore a variety of procedures to help
them achieve an agreement. Rather, today's issues are what forms of ADR
should be adopted, what kinds of settlement programs are acceptable, what
kinds of disputes are appropriate to which forms of ADR,117 whether ADR
providers are (like judges) immune from suits and the reach of their
jurisdiction, 118 and how to increase use of ADR procedures. 119 Discussion
115 That is not to say that implementation of that legal regime is complete. See supra
notes 86-87, 104 and accompanying text.
1 16 Commentators differ on both whether ADR has in fact been met with warmth by
lawyers and if so, why. For example, Laura Nader has argued that what she terms "harmony
ideology-the use of a rhetoric of peace through consensus-finds fertile ground with the legal
profession. ... " Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-form Dispute Resolution, 9 01o ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
1, 1 (1993). In her Schwartz lecture, Professor Nader argued that "ADR rhetoric.., was a
response to the law reform discourse of the 1960s, a discourse concerned with justice and root
causes," and she linked efforts within legal education, the leadership of the Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, publicity efforts directed at practicing lawyers, and
therapeutic rhetoric of healing as the factors that lead lawyers to become advocates of ADR.
Id. at 3, 8-25. Nader's commentary prompted a defense of mediation. See Carol J. King, Are
Justice and Harmony Mutually Exclusive? A Response to Professor Nader, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. REsOL. 65 (1994), which in turn was met by a rejoinder. Laura Nader, A Reply to
Professor King, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 99 (1994).
117 See Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fining the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEG. J. 49 (1994).
1 18 Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1251-54 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that such
immunity attached to mediators and "case evaluators"); Mills v. Killebrew, 765 F.2d 69 (6th
Cir. 1985) (finding immunity).
119 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution:
What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REv. 2079 (1993) (analyzing
forms of participation that could be required); RAUMA & KRAFKA, supra note 33, at 23-24
("opt in" and "opt out" voluntary arbitration programs); Shavell, supra note 32, at 5-7, 16-19
(discussing analysis of incentives created by ex ante agreements to use ADR and ex post
requirements to do so); Katz, supra note 92, at 51-55 (concerns over coercion); SOCIETY OF
PROFESSIONALS IN DIsPUTE RESOLUTION (SPIDR), MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND
SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTs 1-3 (1991)
(Committee chaired by Nancy Rogers, examining mandatory ADR; while supporting it in
anon-binding disputes" under specified conditions, also concerned about coercion to settle,
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centers about the permissible and impermissible incentives to settle, such as
the imposition of penalties for "failure" to settle,120 the legality of vacating
prior court judgments to facilitate parties' settlements, 121 the barriers to
settlement, 122 and the capacity of a court to approve a settlement of a class
action, styled as representing all "future" potential asbestos claimants and
providing what has been called in such large mass torts "global peace." 123
V. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLAIMS MADE FOR ADR
AND VIEWS OF ADJUDICATION
The transformation of the civil process from one disinterested in ADR
to one that both welcomes and has made ADR its own could not have
occurred without arguments made on behalf of ADR. While my
commentary thus far has adverted to the claims made for ADR, I turn now
to analyze those arguments. Below I detail differing kinds of claims made
on behalf of ADR.
As in my discussion above, this analysis could proceed by mapping
specific claims made about different forms of ADR; that approach would
highlight the differences among ADR techniques 124 and would be an
appropriate analytic mode of addressing whether a claimed attribute of ADR
be on the obligatory nature of the process but on whether it is "abusive" or not. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted
or "The Law of ADR, " 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 25 (1991). For consideration of the pros
and cons of ADR in the federal courts, see Stienstra & Villging, supra note 87.
12 0 See William W. Schwarzer, Fee-Shiluing Offers of Judgment An Approach to
Reducing.the Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992).
121 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386,
(1994); Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (1992). See
generally Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement,
and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1471
(1994).
122 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Erperimental Approach, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 107 (1994) (criticizing models of
settlements that fail to consider attitudinal views of disputants as incomplete, and using
undergraduate college students to test hypotheses about the effects on settlement of the
"framing" of an offer, of the status of parties and their interests in equity seeking," and of
who initiates settlement offers).
12 3 Gcorgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (approving
settlement of class action on behalf of all persons exposed to asbestos but who had not filed
suit as of 1993).
124 See supra section III.
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can be empirically validated, 25 whether promoting ADR is wise social
policy, 126 or whether one can explain a particular change in doctrine and
statutes. 127 I am, however, not here interested in debating whether ADR
"works" 128 nor what it actually is (which of course entails enormous
125 One might, for example, compare the claims made by Judge Broderick, supra note
81, at 217-18, on behalf of court-annexed arbitration, and the FJC's evaluation by
MEIERHOEFER, supra note 33, with the critiques posed by Lisa Bernstein and Robert
MacCoun. See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique
of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169, 2211 (1993)
(there is "no conclusive evidence" that court-annexed arbitration will "reduce either the
private or social cost of disputing"); Robert J. MacCoun, Unintended Consequences of Court
Arbitration: A Cautionary Tale from New Jersey, 14 JUST. SYs. J. 229, 230 (1991)
("arbitration is likely to divert many more cases from settlement than from trial"). One could
examine the enthusiasm for judicially-run settlement conferences in light of Carrie Menkel-
Meadow's analysis that empirical evidence does not support either "efficiency or reduction of
delay" claims, but that such settlements might enhance the quality of resolutions. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement
Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rnv. 485, 497-98, 509-14 (1985). Or one could compare Judge
Lambros's view of summary jury trials, supra note 35, with that of Judge Posner, supra note
81, at 377-85. See generally MacCoun, Lind & Tyler, supra note 40.
126 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary
System, 44 HAST. L.J. I (1992); Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. Cn. LEAL F. 43;
Shavell, supra note 32; Galanter & Cahill, supra note 82, at 1387-91.
127 For example, in the context of contractual arbitration, Professor MacNeil explains
the Supreme Court's change in approach in the last two decades as animated by "docket-
clearing pure and simple. That is the Court is motivated to reduce the cases having to be tried
by the judicial system, particularly in the federal judicial system." MACNEIL, supra.note 2, at
172-73 (commenting that "nowhere does the Court admit to such a policy," borne from its
own "vested interests").
128 Examples of such discussion can be found in the essays of Judge Enslen, supra note
80, and Judge Kaufman, Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDuAM L. REv. 1, 22-38 (1990); see also
Judge Broderick, supra note 81 (evaluating efficiency and participant approval of the CAA
program in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania). For critiques of such claims, see generally
Dayton, supra note 38; Keith 0. Boyum, Does Court-Annexed Arbitration "Work"?, 14 JuST.
Sys. J. 244 (1991); James L. Guill & Edward A. Slavin, Rush to Unfairness: The Downside
of ADR, 28 JUDGES J. 8 (1989); Galanter, supra note 70, at 59-82 (evaluating arguments for
settlement). Marc Galanter and Tom R. Tyler raised concern about the ability to engage in
these comparisons. Marc Galanter & Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution
Procedures and Outcomes, Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENv. U. L. REv.
419, 420 (1989). Galanter rejected the effort to evaluate, a priori, either adjudication or
settlement and urged regulation of settlements for quality. Galanter, supra note 70, at 82-84.
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variation).
I take a different tack, in part because discussions of ADR's attributes
often proceed by invoking all methods simultaneously and primarily because
I am not interested in proving or disproving the merits of any particular
form of ADR but rather in understanding what are claimed to be its
advantages, in general, as compared to adjudication. Further, just as ADR
is a set of processes that could be differentiated internally, so are ADR
proponents a diverse group, holding a range of political and social visions.
Because my interest here is not, however, about distinctions within ADR
but about how the debate on behalf of ADR illuminates contemporary
understandings of adjudication, 129 and about the interconnections between
developments within adjudication and the promotion of ADR, 130 the
organization of this section also does not reflect whether a claim is made on
behalf of a particular group of ADR proponents, such as those identified
with empowerment of communities, or with feminism, or with corporate
enterprises.
Thus, the discussion below maps differing kinds of benefit perceived to
be conferred by ADR and the relationship between that benefit and what
adjudication is supposed to afford. Because ADR's success is often marked
by distinguishing ADR from adjudication, attitudes about what adjudication
does and does not do can be found, sometimes explicitly and other times
implicitly, in discussions of ADR. 131
A. Explanations Supporting ADR and Their Reflections on
Adjudication
One could read the rules and statutes on ADR as a national referendum,
standing for the proposition that the conclusions reached by ADR in general
and by settlement in particular are either equal to or better than those
achieved by adjudication by either judge or jury. What is particularly
Tyler believed that reliance on current trial-based systems as the baseline is improper.
Below, as I discuss some of the specific claims made on behalf of ADR, I will note
disputes that surround the efficacy of particular forms of ADR.
129 As Judge Schwarzer has noted, "the context in which ADR has gained a significant
role [is] a time in which courts find themselves under great pressure as well as close
scrutiny." William W. Schwarzer, Keynote Address at the National ADR Institute for Federal
Judges (Nov. 12, 1993) (on file with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution).
130 See Yeazell, supra note 14, at 676-78 (describing the "connectedness and
mutability" of procedure).
131 Similarly, claims made for adjudication ADR include arguments about the nature of
ADR. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) and the response
by Professor Kanowitz, supra note 41.
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interesting is that some of the prominent proponents of this claim are
themselves judges, whom we might have thought would be adjudication
loyalists. What are the elements for the stature of ADR? Below I identify
some of the distinct (yet often overlapping or interrelated) themes.
1. ADR as a Default Position
A major premise of one strand of ADR advocacy is that current
adjudicatory procedures are simply inadequate to the task. ADR functions
not so much as a good, in and of itself, but rather as a good because the
system is in "crisis" and something is needed to fix it. 132 ADR is one of
many techniques of managing this crisis, and might be on an equal footing
with other proposed curative measures, such as curtailing discovery rights
or controlling abusive attorneys. 133
When ADR is proposed on these grounds, it is seen as a useful
alternative because of the claim that ADR is cheaper and quicker than trial,
which is the baseline often used in the discussion. For example, Judge
Raymond Broderick, in an essay entitled "Court-Annexed Compulsory
Arbitration: It Works," described the success he identified to be a reduction
in costs to the litigants and the public and a reduction in time elapsed from
filing to resolution.1M
132 The "system in crisis" approach is evident in the writings of several judges,
including Parker & Hagin, supra note 80, at 1906; Broderick, supra note 81, at 217-18;
Kaufman, supra note 128, at 2-3; and Enslen, supra note 80, at 33. Members of Congress
have adopted a similar vocabulary. See, e.g., The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, S. REP.
No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (Aug. 3, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) (the
administration of justice suffers from the "scourge of two related and worsening plagues ...
the costs of civil litigation.., and a scarcity of resources"). Some academics have described
the problem as a "crisis of confidence." See Jay Folberg, Joshua Rosenberg, & Robert
Barrett, Use of ADR in Calfornia Courts: Findings & Proposals, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 343, 351
(1992). See generally Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 494 (1986).
133 This theme-ADR as one piece of a multi-faceted repertoire-is exemplified in the
CJRA, discussed supra note 96 and accompanying text. ADR could be understood as on a par
with efforts like discovery control or as a vehicle for discovery control. See, e.g., Boyum,
supra note 128, at 246-48 (focusing on the factors used to evaluate whether ADR "works" is
whether the use of discovery has been reduced); Kaufman, supra note 128, at 6 (noting that
ADR is a response in part to lawyers using discovery to drive up the costs of the other side).
134 Broderick, supra note 81, at 222-23. See also Glickman Statement, supra note 105,
at 33 (ADR will help to resolve disputes "faster, cheaper"). In 1918, parallel justifications
were offered for New York City's Municipal Court's conciliation and arbitration program. See
Lauer, supra note 8, at 154 (such methods provide for the "amicable and expeditious disposal
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What is implicit (and sometimes explicit) about adjudication in this
form of praise for ADR? One reading is that ADR is not intrinsically
superior to adjudication. Necessity (caused by a range of factors, such as the
number of judges and the number of disputes, the fees demanded by
attorneys, or the current structure of litigation rules) but not preference
requires the state's adoption of ADR. 135 A related premise is that, because
adjudication is not able to fulfill its own promises, ADR becomes a means
of making good on adjudication's aspirations. ADR thus takes on the
attributes of adjudication. ADR becomes the means for enabling "access to
justice" when adjudication fails.136 Returning to Frank Sander's metaphoric
of litigation").
The claims that ADR reduces litigation costs or increases speed are contested. See, e.g.,
Katz, supra note 92, at 1, 46 (ADR acts as a "new layer of administrative expense for courts
and another layer of transaction costs for litigants"); Galanter, supra note 70 (settlement is not
a cheaper alternative to the parties than adjudication; it is not ADR that works, but the
deadlines that are an artifact of ADR that prompt settlement); Menkel-Meadow, supra note
125, at 494-98 (detailing the many studies, not supporting "convincingly the efficiency
argument").
One issue is whose costs are affected-those of the litigants or those of the public. See
E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CAsES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRIcr COURT 37-40 (1990) (evaluating public and
private costs separately). A second question relates to the baseline chosen: is the relevant
comparison cases tried or cases not tried?
135 See Resnik, supra note 97, at 1207 (Kenneth Feinberg's discussion of the need for
the "judiciary, confronting clogged dockets, to develop more flexibility in fashioning
mediation, settlement, arbitration, mini trials, summary jury trials, and other ways to get the
cases resolved.... [lt's an essential ... because the courts are ill equipped to try these
cases [mass tort cases] one at a time.").
136 Not only did Sander justify his proposal in part on that basis, see supra note 19, but
many other ADR proponents have invoked an access to justice theme. See, e.g., Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 119, at 6 (in the 1960s, ADR was advanced because of its qualitative-
justice reasoning, which was based on "community empowerment, party participation, and
access to justice"); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: Hearings on H.R. 2497 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1990) (statement of Marshall J. Breger, Chairman,
Administrative Conference of the United States) [hereinafter Breger Statement] ("high cost of
participation in the administrative process or court review ... can freeze out smaller, less
affluent interests").
See also Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal
Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridicial Subject, 66
DENY. U. L. REv. 437, 450-52 (1989) (analyzing "access to justice" elements in ADR as
adopting rhetoric but also attempting to change justice's forms); Harry Edwards,
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multi-doored courthouse, the doors to ADR are opened because the door to
superior court is perceived either to be functionally closed or slightly ajar.
Another reading of this form of support for ADR has a different focus.
The claim that ADR is less expensive than adjudication may also entail the
claim that litigation is unnecessarily expensive and wasteful. 137 Sometimes
an ADR form is preferable because it is provides a quicker, cheaper quasi-
adjudication (i.e. court-annexed arbitration) and sometimes an ADR form is
preferable because it eschews adjudication altogether. Under this view,
ADR moves out from under; ADR is no longer a default position, but a
practice preferred to adjudication, for it is a way to make the world
"better."
2. ADR as More Congenial than Adjudication
A second form of praise for ADR is about its potential for kindness as
contrasted (sometimes explicitly) with nastiness, which is associated with
adjudication. 138 ADR is perceived to be friendly, flexible, and nicer than
the uncivil exchanges that characterize litigation.
This congenial theme contains a bundle of claims, which is worth
sorting through. One means by which ADR is believed to achieve a
congenial tone is because some forms of ADR have the potential to reduce
the role of attorneys. 139 Less lawyering is not only a way to minimize fees
and thus make the process less expensive and speedier (linking this theme
Commentary: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REv. 668,
672-74 (1986) (considering "docket clearing" claims and potential, as well as risks of ADR).
137 Breger Statement, supra note 136, at 72 (without ADR, government agencies would
'waste money in years of unnecessary litigation"). See also Parker & Hagin, supra note 80,
at 1906 ("[j]ustice costs too much"); Lambros, supra note 35, at 8 (settlements following
summary jury trials avoid the "hefty tab for witnesses, experts, and other costs associated with
trials").
1 3 8 Representative William Hughes, a Democrat from New Jersey and then Chair of the
House's Committee on the Judiciary, put it this way: mediation and conciliation "may be
better suited to produce lasting resolutions without enduring rancor," because they are
.cooperative." Administrative Dispute Resolution Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Propeny and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (May 20, 1992). Judge Robert Zampano of the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut argues that "[a]ilmost all aspects of the litigation process are
painful and it is natural to seek to avoid them." Provine, supra note 82, at 92 (describing
judicial "optimism" about settlement and "pessimism about trial").
139 Parker and Hagin put forth a "reformation model" of ADR, in which the first stage
in the "Litigation Track" would not involve parties' attorneys. Parker & Hagin, supra note
80, at 1915.
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back to that of ADR as a default position), but less lawyering is also seen as
more civilized and as more responsive to the problems at issue. A world
with fewer lawyers is imagined to be less rigid and more inventive. 140 The
assumption is that, without lawyers, the disputants are empowered to act,
and with that empowerment, can shape solutions more responsive to their
needs than third parties, in role as adjudicators, would impose.
The ADR-as-congenial set of claims is not wholly dependent upon the
elimination of lawyers. Rather, ADR is also seen as beneficial when
lawyers are present-to educate and civilize lawyers by focusing them on
the needs of their clients. Some forms of ADR aspire to teach lawyers that
initiating settlement negotiations and engaging in various forms of
compromise are not signs of weakness. 141 Other forms of ADR hope to
provide clients with information directly, enabling clients to better monitor
their lawyers who may not always be loyal agents. While adjudicatory
modes increase parties' dependence on lawyers, ADR may, under this view,
both lessen parties' dependence on lawyers and focus lawyers' attention
more directly on parties' needs and interests.
ADR as a vehicle for more thoughtful and congenial exchanges is not
only aimed at refraining how lawyers and disputants behave; ADR is also a
means of changing judicial behavior. While rejecting the image of the judge
as "passive" or as an "umpire," ADR proponents are not eager to embrace
the nomenclature of the "activist judge." That term has (for some) negative
connotations borne out of its association with judicial efforts to enforce
structural injunctions involving schools, prisons, and mental hospitals. 142
Instead, the image under ADR is of a gentler, more conversational judge,
urging accommodation.
In the early 1980s, I termed some of the reformation of the judicial role
the creation of "managerial judges." 143 Judge Enslen speaks of judicial
accountability and responsibility.14 The purpose of new labels is to capture
140 Breger Statement, supra note 136, at 66 ("Citizens who are quite effective when
attempting informally to persuade their colleagues or friends of the justness of their cause can
become reticent when placed in a forum that forces them to present their views within
procedural constraints designed for law school graduates.").
141 Enslen, supra note 80, at 27. See also the Honorable Gordon L. Doerfner, Taking
Pre-Trial Conferences Seriously Under 2-me Standards, 36-Feb B. B.J. 13, 13, 15.
142 See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980) (detailing that,
historically, courts have been involved in structural changes, but that it was not until the
twentieth century civil rights era that courts engaged in that role on behalf of litigants such as
prisoners).
143 Resnik, supra note 70, at 378-79.
144 Enslen, supra note 80, at 4-5. Supportive of judicial roles at settlement, Magistrate
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change, to mark the breadth of the judicial role and the involvement of a
judge from the filing to the disposition of a lawsuit. As the decade closes,
another term has made its way in federal statutes: the Civil Justice Reform
Act speaks of the obligations not of "judges" but of "judicial officers." 145
This reference underscores that ADR has not only redefined the role for
judges but also has been one of several factors prompting Congress to
authorize increased reliance on magistrate and bankruptcy judges, who lack
life tenure. This array of judicial officers, now including both judges with
Article m protections and those without, are all charged with encouraging
parties to undertake ADR, to function sometimes as facilitators, sometimes
as mediators, sometimes as super senior partners to lawyers on both sides of
the cases. 146 The backdrop roles remain; judicial officers can also be
sanctioners or adjudicators, which may either impede their facilitating work
or provide greater incentives for parties to cooperate.
ADR is thus seen as a set of processes more comfortable than
adjudication. Litigant satisfaction and enthusiasm for ADR mechanisms are
cited as evidence of ADR's accessibility and intelligibility. 147 The
Judge Hogan speaks of the need for an "adaptivist" legal system. Hogan, supra note 82, at
433 (quoting S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 151 (1985)).
145 See 28 U.S.C. § 473.
146 Some commentators raise concern that employing judges to conduct ADR may
prompt coercive behavior in their pursuit of settlement. See, e.g., Administrative Dispute
Resolution Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (May 20,
1992) (The Honorable Leo Wagner, Magistrate Judge, N.D. Okla.) ("parties [may be] afraid
to do anything but accept the suggestion of the judge who is going to try the case"); Katz,
supra note 92, at 16 (unethical behavior by judges promoting settlement, including "delaying
rulings, threatening penalties for not settling, . . . giving favorable rulings to the weaker
side"). See aiso Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing trial judge who
sanctioned a litigant for settling during rather than before trial). Other commentators raise
concerns about the absence of congressional authorization for some of the innovations judges
have generated under the ADR rubric. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 81, at 386.
147 Broderick, supra note 81, at 222-23 (surveying judges, lawyers, and litigants); E.
Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun, Patricia A. Ebener, William L.F. Felstiner, Deborah
Hensler, Judith Resnik & Tom R. Tyler, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 953, 965-
66 (1990) (finding that litigant satisfaction was highest in trial and in court-annexed
arbitration, and lower when litigants were absent from negotiations, in either judge-run or
bilateral settlement conferences); JANE W. ADLER, DEBORAH R. HENSLER & CHARLES E.
NELSON, SIMPLE JUSTIcE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITrSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION
PROGRAM (1983) at xiii-xiv (litigant satisfaction with program). But see Dayton, supra note
38, at 914-915 (questioning implications of such data).
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informality of ADR and its potential for privacy are assumed to put parties
at their ease, and with that ease, to bring about better resolutions.
Conversation and cooperation replace conflict; 148 informality empowers.
Some of those who pursue ADR for its interactive qualities identify
themselves as feminists or humanists. For some feminists, relying on
cultural feminist claims about "women's ways," 149 adjudication is grounded
in "male" models of combat. 150 In contrast, ADR is seen as offering the
opportunity for accommodation, and with it an escape from the win/loss
hierarchy. 151 Other feminists mistrust alternatives to adjudication-fearing
that the interaction between some forms of ADR (emphasizing conciliation)
and women's stereotypical socialization will make women too ready to
agree and too vulnerable to pressures for consent. 152
The vision of ADR as communicative and congenial comes with a frank
critique of many of the attributes of adjudication. The formality of
adjudication is perceived as undermining open communication. The
procedural requirements of adjudication are described as roadblocks to
communication and to fairness.' 53 The rights of public access and
14 8 Lucy Katz points out the tension that mandatory ADR brings to this congenial
theme; she further documents the shift in doctrine, from a view that one cannot compel
conference, to the current regime of court-enforced mediation and negotiation obligations. See
Katz, supra note 92, at 20-22.
14 9 The work of CAROL GILuGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PsYCHoLOGIcAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) is frequently cited as exemplifying this view. See also
MARY F. BELENKY, BLYrHE McVICKER CLINCHY, NANCY RULE GOLDBERGER, JILL
MArrUCK TARuLE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING (1986).
150 Janet Ritkin, Mediau'on from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW
& INEQ. J. 21, 22, 26 (1984) (contrasting adjudication and mediation); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L. REv. 754, 763 n.28, 797-98 (1984) (invoking Carol Gilligan's work, but also
noting "[w]hether a focus on the needs of both parties is a particularly female mode of
problem solving is still unknown").
151 According to Professor Menkel-Meadow, non-adversarial negotiation requires skills
such as "ascertain[ing] ... clients' underlying needs," "explore" and "probe" via attentive
listening, while adversarial negotiation (occurring within the "shadow of courts") is more
focused on power and obtaining strategic advantage; reliance may be placed on "cloak[ing]
real preferences" to avoid one's opponent taking advantage of that knowledge. Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 150, at 8024, 766, 778-80.
152 See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545, 1582-83 (1991).
153 Breger Statement, supra note 136, at 66 ("Formality also tends to place a premium
on procedural expertise."). See also Parker & Hagin, supra note 80, at 1911-15 (urging less
formality).
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information are seen as intrusive on private parties, who might otherwise
respond to the state in its role as facilitator of agreements. Adjudication is
seen as a process that often brings out the worst in its participants, either
because it distorts their abilities to pursue self-interest or because it defines
self-interest in such a fashion that requires inflicting losses, rather than
maximizing gains.
3. ADR as More Efficient than Adjudication
I turn now from claims of ADR as responsive to systemic problems,
such as that of a workload crisis, dysfunction, and incivility, to clarify a
sometimes overlapping claim, that ADR's responsiveness to the needs of the
disputants makes ADR a better means of resolving disputes (and hence good
for the system as well). This thesis comes from participants with different
perspectives and varies to some extent with the kind of ADR at issue.
For those forms of ADR that are focused on settlement, three
assumptions result in efficiency: first, settlements by parties are voluntary;
second, the parties have better information than adjudicators; third, with
information and volition, parties have the control to achieve outcomes that
are better than those imposed by adjudicators. 154 Settlement-oriented A.DR
thus becomes a more efficient way to resolve disputes than adjudication. 155
154 See, e.g., Breger Statement, supra note 136, at 79 (stating that the purpose of the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act was based "wholly on the principle of consent" and
with that consent, parties could "shape procedures to meet their needs on a case by case
basis"). Some of these themes can be found in Melvin Eisenberg's discussion of the
desirability of negotiated disputes. See Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation:
Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 -ARv. L. Rnv. 637 (1976).
For concerns about the quality of information, about information disparity among
parties, and about the inefficiencies of bargaining, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres,
Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 325-26 (1994) (a critical source of
power for mediators is to respond to parties' disparate information; mediators control
information, "caucus" with the parties, and create "noise" by disclosing or refusing to
disclose information); George Lowenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda
Babcock, Self Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEo. STuD.
135, 140-41 (1993) (self-serving assessments of fairness-"ego-centric biases," and a host of
other biases, result in inaccuracies in bargaining); Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations
Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OrIO ST. J. ON DisP. RnsoL
235 (1993). See also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MrcH. L. Ray. 319 (1991)
(examining verdicts to offer hypothesis on when bargaining fails to result in settlement).
155 These claims have become the subject of debate. First, if the desired outcome is that
which comes from voluntarism and private dealmaking, how does the intrusion by the state,
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As Marshall Breger, Chairman of the Administrative Conference put it:
"Consensual solutions are by definition ones in which interested members
of the public have participated and reached agreement. Far more than
outcomes imposed by government agencies, solutions reached via ADR will
have the support and understanding, and meet the real needs, of agencies
and affected parties." 156 His views are echoed by federal district judge
Robert Keeton: "Scratch a trial judge, and beneath the surface, more often
than not, you'll find a believer in the proposition that if more judges
followed his or her techniques, more cases would be settled, and to the
mutual advantage of the parties who would otherwise be locked in combat,
consuming their resources as well as those of the court system.
" 157
Consent is also assumed to have benefits beyond the immediate
resolution of the problem. The premise is that if parties agree to and craft a
resolution, long term compliance will result. Indeed, for some ADR
proponents, volition is so central to ADR that ADR is at risk if it becomes a
mandatory part of the state's apparatus. 158
Efficiency claims on behalf of ADR forms that are quasi-adjudicatory
rest not on consent as much as on speed, accessibility, and on the quantum
of procedure provided. Court-annexed arbitration is described as a quicker,
insisting on parties exploring settlement, affect outcomes? Second, if the crisis story is
correct, and adjudication is simply unavailable, then settlements of disputes may not be the
product of volition but rather of coercion, or some other set of incentives.
Third, what is the relationship between the parties' agreement and the state's law? See
Alexander, supra note 37, at 575-77 (empirical review of small number of settlements in a set
of federal securities class actions, all of which settled at almost the same one quarter of the
poteitial damage; concluding that those settlements were not driven by either parties' choice
or by the merits of the case, but by a "market in settlements," influenced by a variety of
incentives of the many participants. Settlements were not an "accurate" reflection of injury
discounted by risk and costs of trial, but were driven by the incentives of the participants,
making these class actions function as insurance against market losses for a relatively small
number of investors.). Alexander believed that "the claims that settlement is intrinsically
preferable to adjudication and that any freely negotiated resolution is ipso facto an acceptable
resolution are not persuasive in securities class actions." Id. at 568.
Other ADR critics argue that no empirical evidence validates the proposition that
federally-sponsored ADR results in more settlements. See Dayton, supra note 38, at 928.
156 Breger Statement, supra note 136, at 66.
157 Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension With Uniformity, 50
U. Prrr. L. REv. 853, 861 (1989).
158 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 92, at 3 (ADR should be voluntary); Bernstein, supra
note 125, at 2239 (advocating private ADR, among other reasons because it allows parties to
select their arbitrator and the rules to be used); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 119, at 53 (in
order for ADR to work, it must be by the consent of the parties).
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shorter, less formal trial. 159 Because efficiency is not simply equated with
economy but also entails accuracy (or sufficient accuracy in light of reduced
costs), claims made for scaled-down adjudication embody a serious critique
of adjudication. The point made is that the outcomes are just as good, or
good enough, with less process, less cost, less delay.
4. ADR as Fairer than Adjudication
The efficiency arguments for ADR are sometimes turned into or related
to arguments about fairness. Both arguments (ADR as more efficient and
ADR as fairer than adjudication) share a view that parties have superior
access to and actual possession of information than do third party decision
makers. From this vantage point, adjudication is seen as a technique that
can both distract and confuse. Legal rules operate to frame debates in a
fashion that obscures parties' goals and that results in either wins or losses,
rather than a richer set of possible resolutions. 160 In contrast, ADR is seen
as focusing on issues, relaxing the law, and thus providing more "just"
results. 161 In the words of a 1994 draft report of a committee of the federal
judiciary: "Often, a fair settlement by the parties, with or without court
involvement, is the preferable resolution for particular litigation." 162
The perceived fairness of ADR may, like the other claims detailed
above, vary with the kind of program used. For example, proponents of
159 Broderick, supra note 81, at 218.
160 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 125, at 503-05; Menkel-Meadow, supra note
150, at 801-04; Eisenberg, supra note 154, at 643-46, 654-60.
161 See, e.g., Yardenna Hurvitz, Power, Protection, and Family Law: ADR Produces
More Equitable Results than the Adversarial System, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., May 9, 1994,
at S33.
Again, disputes exist about the empirical bases for such claims, as studied in the context
of particular forms of ADR. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 92, at 50 (summarizing critiques of
ADR); Michelle Hermann, Gary Lafree, Christine Rack & Mary Beth West, Summary: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Race and Gender on Small Claims Adjudication and
Mediation, in THE METROCOURT FINAL PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTs OF ETHNICITY
AND GENDER IN MEDIATED AND ADJUDICATED SMALL CLAIM CASES AT THE METROPOLITAN
COURT MEDIATION CENTER, BERNALuLLo COUNTY, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO (Jan.
1993) (submitted to Fund for Dispute Resolution) (research on civil, non-jury litigation
involving money and filed in Albuquerque, New Mexico; evidence that mediation results
varied by ethnicity of participants); Alexander, supra note 37 (settlements not related to the
legal merits of disputes).
162 LONG RANGE PLANNING COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 53 (Draft for Public Comment,
Nov. 1994) [hereinafter PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN].
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ADR as more fair may cite litigant reports of more satisfaction with court-
annexed ADR than with judicially run settlement conferences at which they
are not present, 163 and argue for court-annexed arbitration but not other
forms of ADR. Moreover, not only may proponents argue on behalf of a
particular form of ADR (such as mediation), they may also believe that
those processes are inappropriate for particular kinds of cases. 164
Notice that both ADR as more efficient and ADR as more fair are
dependent upon the revision of the 1950s assumptions exemplified by the
Wiko case. 16 Recall those concerns-that the parties may not be bargaining
equals, that certain parties had the potential to exploit the bargaining
setting, and, further, that whatever the deals parties might make, those
agreements might not accord with social regulatory goals. In the 1950s, the
parties' views of their rights and obligations were not seen as the only set of
issues at stake when federal courts' jurisdiction was invoked. Further, the
capacity of the court to act in public was understood as instructing third
parties. Now, forty years later, parties' agreements are often seen as both
justifying and embodying the "right" response. Further, adjudication is now
seen as aimed at resolution as much as regulation, thereby creating the
means, first for equating the two forms of dispute resolution, and then for
ADR to trump adjudication.
B. The Relationships: Complementary, Competitive, Conquering, or
Indistinguishable?
While ADR proponents are making any or all of the arguments outlined
above, they often also comment that they are not advocating changes in
adjudication. Take for example the statement of Marshall Breger, head of
the Administrative Conference and testifying on behalf of the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990. He praised ADR as faster,
cheaper, better, more imaginative and creative than adjudication. At the
same time, he stated that he was proposing "building in complementary
resolution methods, not usurping current adjudicatory procedures....
ADR methods are simply voluntary options that offer additional routes to
163 Lind, MacCoun, Ebener, Felstiner, Hensler, Resnik & Tyler, supra note 147, at
965-66.
164 Grillo, supra note 152 (criticizing mandatory mediation in divorce and concerned
that it disadvantages women); Lisa Lehrman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse
Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984)
(believing that, while mediation in cases of wife abuse is harmful, adjudication also has severe
limitations in these cases).
165 Wrilco V. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See also supra notes 43-49 and accompanying
text.
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justice."166 The legislative history of that Act echoes his view: the ADR
techniques "are intended to supplement-not replace or limit-existing
dispute resolution practices and procedures." 167 Similarly, Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow enters the debate about the judicial role at settlement
conferences "to maximize their usefulness without seriously threatening the
appropriate role of judges in formal adjudication."168 The 1993 Report of
the Society of Dispute Resolution Providers reiterates this theme:
"[i]ncreased use of private dispute resolution processes should complement,
not replace, continued efforts to improve the public justice system." 169
At other points, ADR proponents claim not that ADR is supplementary
to but that it mirrors adjudication. For example, rejecting criticism of ADR
as a mechanism for private settlement rather than for public
pronouncement,11 0 ADR proponents argued that the image of adjudication
has been distorted. "The vast preponderance of cases ... are now settled
without addressing any significant, or even recurring, issues of importance
to society." 171
Two descriptions of ADR and adjudication can therefore be identified,
both assuming compatibility but for different reasons. Under one vision,
ADR and adjudication are distinct and complementary; one supplements the
other. Under the other, the two forms are more similar than distinct. ADR
is sufficiently close to adjudication that the two are compatible.
I think that the claim of supplementation will not be long lasting and
that the claim of similarity is more complex than usually stated. ADR
functions less as a court's adjunct than as a competitor.172 My point here is
166 Breger Statement, supra note 136, at 73 (emphasis in the original).
167 S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. at 3932. See also
Sherman, supra note 119, at 2082-83, 2086 (litigation and ADR "have a great deal in
common .... Both place a high value on a rational approach to dispute resolution, fairness
of process, and the centrality of party autonomy.")
16 8 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 125, at 486. See also Lambros, A New Adversarial
Model, supra note 81, at 796 ("Settlement [assisted by ADR] and adjudication are
complementary; they are not mutually exclusive, nor are they incompatible." (emphasis in the
original)). In her later essays, Professor Menkel-Meadow has seen more of the conflict. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 119, at 32 ("The use of settlement activity in the courts should
be understood as the clash of two cultures.").
169 SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PUBLIC ENCOURAGEMENT OF
PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: IMPLICATIONS, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (Report
#2 of the SPIDR Law and Public Policy Committee, 1993) (on file with the Ohio State
Journal on Dispute Resolution).
170 For such concerns, see Fiss, supra note 131.
171 Breger Statement, supra note 136, at 72.
172 Professor Edward Brunet makes a related point, in his essay, Questioning the
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not primarily turf, about private litigants with resources purchasing
adjudication from sources other than the state. 17 3 While federal and state
judges perhaps should worry that they may lose in the competition for the
"good" cases, 174 these judges (and others) should also attend to the
competition about and among values. ADR-and especially the embrace of
settlement-is both a product of and the means by which adjudication is
both reframed and devalued in this political system.
Despite a friendly facade, implicit in many of the claims for ADR as
"better" is a deeply-held criticism of the contemporary version of
adjudication: that the outcomes produced are too expensive, too time
consuming, not close enough to the merits, not responsive to parties'
interests, not (in sum) "worth it." 175 The descriptive arguments on behalf of
Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REV. 1, 47-56 (1987) (analyzing the
market for ADR and adjudication, describing ADR as both a competitor and as a partner, but
finds the rivalry "dynamic," "positive" and "healthy" for dispute processing). Galanter and
Lande also see the competition between public and private courts as potentially generative.
Marc Gaanter & John Lande, Private Courts and Public Authority, in 12B STUD. IN L., POL.
& Soc'Y 393, 412-13 (Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat eds., 1992). 1 am less sanguine that the
current ideological framing and constrained resources permit the creative dynamism to which
these authors aspire. See also Garth, supra note 11, at 385-87 (discussing the "market" in
dispute resolution and the effects of the current competition between public and private
providers); Doris Marie Provine & Carroll Seron, Privatization of Judicial Services, 3 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 319, 332, 334 (1991) (current "mood of crisis" diminishes focus on
the "public, policymaking purposes" of courts and may "undermine the full, rich, and varied
tasks of courts in the body politic.").
17 3 Several organizations, including "JAMS" (Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services), and "Judicate," provide private adjudication services. See Bernstein, supra note
125, at 2187-89 (describing these enterprises). Concerns include the potential for a "brain
drain" of judges, fleeing the lower-paid public sector work for better pay and working
conditions in the private sector, which may leave the public sector to litigants who cannot
afford to opt out. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, THE REPORT AND
RECoMMENDATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMrrrEE ON PRIVATE JUDGES
19-20 (1992); Kirk Johnson, Public Judges as Private Contractors: A Legal Frontier, N.Y.
TmIMs, Feb. 10, 1993, at BIl. Others are concerned that poorer litigants will not fare as well
as rich litigants when they participate in the private sector and that private courts lack
accountability. Galanter & Lande, supra note 172, at 397-98 (summarizing objections).
Another issue is what cases, within the public judging system, are tracked to less fulsome
processes-a kind of de facto privatization or alteration of the "public" adjudication by
delegation to staff. See Robel, supra note 11, at 899-900.
174 See Garth, supra note 11, at 367; Robel, supra note 11, at 899-900.
175 Galanter and Lande offer a related commentary-that the ADR "movement" is "held
together" by its critique of adjudication, and that framed by intellectual roots in psychology
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ADR make a normative claim about adjudication. One can track the
relationship between the growth in interest in ADR and changes in
adjudication as it has been conceived under the framework of the 1938
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: the diminution of interest in
adjudication's rights pronouncement and its capacity for fact finding and the
pressures to transform adjudication, causing a melding of adjudication and
ADR, sometimes into a simplified adjudication and sometimes into a
settlement-oriented set of managerial procedures. 176
Having posited this relationship, I should also respond to questions
about the links I have drawn between contemporary promotion of ADR and
the frustration with and hostility to adjudication. One set of issues relates to
causation, which (as I stated at the outset) is not my enterprise here. 177
Instead, I am interested in the interaction of two generic modes of dispute
resolution, one styled "adjudication" and one styled "alternative dispute
resolution"-even as we know that both are constructs, with internal
distinctions, a variety of expressions, and a good deal of overlap. 178 Thus,
the next question I need to explore is whether hostility to adjudication is
intrinsic in the institutionalization at the end of the twentieth century of
ADR by the state.
Several comments are in order. First, ADR proponents sought to imbed
ADR into the state's processes. In their advocacy, many expressly
denigrated adjudicatory processes. It is possible that, had ADR proponents
not gone that route, not attempted to make ADR a part of the state's justice
apparatus but had sought instead only that the state recognize the validity of
extra-judicial ADR, that the aggression toward adjudication might have
been damped down; perhaps coexistence might then have resulted. One
cannot tell how an unfettered market would have valued the two forms of
and "ideologies of empowerment and self-knowledge," ADR "entrepreneurs" have promoted
these alternatives. Silbey & Sarat, supra note 172, at 440-45.
176 As Stephen Yeazell puts it, "Trials are an endangered species." Yeazell, supra note
14, at 667.
177 For the view that the shift away from adjudication to "technocratic administration" is
a response to structural conditions, including increased demand for the limited resources of
courts and the lack of a radical reallocation of funds, see WoLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL
SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
45-57, 81-89 (1990). See also Galanter & Cahill, supra note 82, at 1388 (in the context of
settlements, proliferation of providers is as much a response to demand as a cause of
demand).
178 See, e.g., Robel, supra note 11, at 895-96 (the "privatization continuum'); Galanter
& Lande, supra note 172, at 399-400 (charting the "dimensions of privatization"); Judith
Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 405, 424-27 (1987)
(discussing the continuum of judicial and litigants' actions).
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dispute resolution because regulation has intervened to mandate that the
state provide and litigants use ADR.
Second, ADR is by no means the only source of criticism about
adjudication in general and its regulatory aspects in particular. The last two
decades have witnessed a rise in anti-lawyer, anti-regulatory, anti-
government rhetoric and sentiments. Had ADR emerged at a time when
lawyers were not perceived as economically greedy, when the polity was
celebrating governmental regulation, and when public and private officials
lauded adjudication as the vehicle by which to police that regulation, the
attitude toward ADR would likely have been different. 179 What has
occurred has taken place in the context of distrust of government and
promotion of privatization.180 ADR has become linked to the general
hostility to government decision making, and adjudication has been linked
with the disdained regime of government as regulator.
Third, perhaps the negativity around adjudication could have been
either submerged or unsuccessful, had adjudication proponents been
themselves more visible and vocal. Intriguingly, many within the federal
judiciary are participating in the ADR movement without having shaped the
conversation to preserve much interest in the activities unique to judges. It
is hard to find discussion of the value of elements attributed to adjudication:
its attention paid to the individual instance, its effort to announce, explain,
and generate public norms, its slowness, its labor intensive and messy
activity of attempting to reconstruct events so as to attach the label "fact"
from whence "law" and "judgment" can flow.' 81 Indeed, visible examples
179 The reliance on agencies as ADR in the 1940s to the 1960s may be an example of
this approach, that is of a continued expression of interest in legal rather than consensual
results, but in the relocation of adjudicatory-like processes to another forum.
180 In the context of health care reform, Rashi Fein describes this as a view that "places
primary emphasis on government as the institution that structures (economic) incentives so as
to encourage individual behavior associated with desired outcomes. It is a restricted view of
government and a narrow view of the forces that motivate individual behavior." Fein, supra
note 17, at 44.
181 Judge Eisele is a rare exception among judges. See Eisele, supra note 79. See also
Judge Robert Keeton, supra note 157, (offering as a test of justice under Fed, R. Civ. P. l's
mandate that courts seek a "just determination:" that judges strive to ensure that "a dispute is
resolved A) on the merits, and B) as determined by governing substantive law."); Judge Jack
B. Weinstein, Judges and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Aug. 9, 1988) (speech before the
ABA, Session on Judicial Power and ADR, Toronto, Canada, manuscript on file with the
Ohio Sate Journal on Dispute Resolution) (concerned that courts must remain open, that
judges should provide opportunities to vindicate substantive rights, and that the "American
tradition" of rights to trial not be compromised by the imposition of penalties for trial, but also
advocating an "affirmative role" for judges to encourage settlement); Jack B. Weinstein,
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of rights announcement-in the context of school desegregation, criminal
defendants' rights, and abortion-have been held up by some as exemplars
of how adjudication fails.
Instead of a lively stream of celebratory commentary, prominent federal
judges have played central roles in the promotion of an array of anti-
adjudication events. Above, I detailed judicial promotion of ADR. In
addition, many judges-such as Judge Richard Posner,1s2 former Judge
Robert Bork, 83 and Justice Antonin Scalial4-have also proposed the
relocation of some federal judicial business, and specifically individual
Warning: Alternative Dispute Resolution May Be Dangerous to Your Health, LITIGATION,
Spring 1986, at 6, 48.
Further, while there was federal judicial opposition to the CJRA, it did not take the form
of objections to congressional attitudes toward ADR but was largely predicated on judicial
concern for the ability to control their own decisions about case management, free from
congressional oversight. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2468 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 6 & June 26, 1990).
Academics provide examples of essays about the value of adjudication. See Fiss, supra
note 131; Resnik, supra note 70; Resnik, supra note 178. Resnik, supra note 132; Brunet
supra note 172. Further, in their analysis of the changes in federal trial processes, Wolf
Heydebrand and Carroll Seron warn that technocratic values, of speed and efficiency, are
overtaking democratic values embodied in adjudication. HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note
177, at 222-23. See also discussion of Alschuler, infra note 208 and accompanying text.
Galanter and Lande argue that contemporary "rights talk" has been "transformed, and in
some ways domesticated, in the face of the [ADR] discourses of interest and need." Galanter
& Lande, supra note 172, at 497.
18 2 RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 161-62 (Harvard
1985); Richard Posner, Coping with the Caseload. A Comment on Magistrates and Masters,
137 U. PA. L. Rnv. 2215, 2216 (1989) (discussing Congress' "unwillingness" to shift
appellate review of agency decisions to agencies themselves). Judge Posner has raised
questions about some forms of ADR; for example, he commented that federal judges lack the
authority, without congressional revisions of statutes, to order summary jury trials or court-
annexed arbitration. Posner, supra note 81, at 385, 91. Further, Posner argued that such
programs may not diminish demand on courts nor are they conducted in a manner that permits
evaluation of their effects. Id. at 392-93.
183 Robert Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article I Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 (1976)
(address at the Pound Conference). See also DEPT. OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REvISION OF THE
FED. JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 7-11 (1977) (committee
chaired by Robert Bork when he was Solicitor General).
18 4 Address by Justice Antonin Scalia to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation
and the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987), reprinted in 34 FED. B.
NEws & J. 252 (1987).
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statutory claims, to agency adjudicators and away from the Article III
judiciary.185 Their advocacy has occurred during decades when Congress,
with the Supreme Court's approval, has permitted delegation of adjudication
to the non-Article I members of the federal judiciary, to administrative
law judges, and to hearing officers in the claims facilities emerging out of
large scale tort cases. 186 These lower tier adjudicators are all people with
few resources, relatively little prestige, and high case loads. The continuing
shift of fact finding in individual small claim cases away from the Article IT
judiciary works to confirm the place of that aspect of adjudication as a less
desirable activity. 187
Fourth, federal adjudication has also undergone substantial changes
over the second half of the twentieth century, making difficult argument for
any one version of it and blurring its features. In addition to the delegation
of adjudication and its fragmentation detailed above, Professor Stephen
Yeazell has delineated how the reformation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure created an elaborated pretrial process.188 The expansion of the
pretrial process created a space-under the rules filled with pretrial motions
and discovery-in which judges have dominion and in which ADR activities
can take place. Many judges in that sprawling pretrial process have
responded by attempting to give shape to lawsuits and bring them to
resolution. Major shifts in both power (more to the district court) and the
modes of decision making (alternatives to adjudication) have resulted from
that 1930s rulemaking. 189
Sociologists Wolf Heydebrand and Carroll Seron have demonstrated
185 See Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal
Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REv. 909 (1990).
186 Recall that one of the classic distinctions between arbitration and adjudication is that
one is a process conducted by someone called an "arbitrator," while adjudication requires a
"judge." Until 1990, federal magistrates were called just that-magistrates. They did not
receive the title "magistrate judge" until 1990. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117; 28 U.S.C. § 631 (1990). According to the
legislative history, the addition of the word "judge" for magistrates was "designed to reflect
more accurately the responsibilities and duties of the office." Federal Courts Study Committee
Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990).
18 7 Surveys of life-tenured appellate judges describe them as concerned about their
profession. They perceive a deterioration in the amount of reflection and deliberation. They
report that techniques, such as unpublished opinions and delegation to staff, are means of
responding to caseload problems. Robel, supra note 11, at 903.
188 Yeazell, supra note 14. Judge Posner described the promulgation of these rules as
the beginning of the federal courts as "an arena of massive experimentation in judicial
administration." Posner, supra note 81, at 393.
189 Yeazell, supra note 14, at 660-70.
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how structural reorganization, growing caseloads, and procedural
innovation shifted the environment of the federal courts to one centered on
administration, rather than adjudication. 190 Professor Bundy described other
changes in federal civil litigation; that cases have become increasingly
multi-party and complex, that substantive law has permitted a wealth of
claims against litigants who had previously not been exposed to liability,
that the bar has grown but lawyer training constricted. 191 In an article, From
"Cases" to "Litigation," I traced increasing interest in and acceptance of
aggregated, large-scale litigation over these past three decades. 192 Professor
Lauren Robel has focused on the "privatization" of appellate adjudication,
with its increased reliance on unpublished opinions and on staff
decisionmaking. 193
The result of the reformulating of adjudication is that it begins to
resemble, incorporate, or subsume ADR. Illustrative is the 1994 proposed
report of the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, which in its chapter "Adjudication," defines that term as
"encompass[ing] a number of different fimctions, from managing the
preliminary phases of a case and appeals to concluding proceedings
.... "194 Thus, changes are coming from within and without, moving the
forms of decision making.
Fifth, the intellectual climate of law schools has spawned (if not always
welcomed) a series of movements, from the legal realists of the 1930s to the
law and economics and critical studies movement of the 1980s, that cast
doubt on an image of adjudication as a deeply deliberative, apolitical,
rational process. In those social sciences interested in law, studies of law in
action have generated an anthropological literature that moved the frame
from courts to dispute processing, in general and in diverse locales. 195
These factors provide additional context in which to evaluate the
relationship between ADR and adjudication. ADR's ascendancy did not
occur in a static world, 196 and its ideological claims converge and overlap
with related intellectual frames. During this era, when individual volition is
praised and government aid described as a means of oppressing its
190 HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 177, at 1-17, 185-219.
191 Bundy, supra note 126, at 26-36.
192 Judith Resnik, From 'Cases" to "litigation", 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5
(1991).
193 Robel, supra note 11, at 898-901.
194 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 162, at 43.
195 Galanter & Lande, supra note 172, at 460-71.
196 Nancy Rogers phrased the point well: perhaps adjudication died before ADR rose.
Conversation, with Nancy Rogers, Assoc. Dean and Professor of Law at the Ohio State
University College of Law, in Columbus, Ohio (March 1994).
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recipients, ADR's view of adjudication (as stuck in an outmoded "rights
based" adversarial model) becomes easy to hear. 197 The state's function
becomes no longer one of either announcing rights, regulating behavior, or
policing the interactions of disputants (as it was during the Wilko era).
Instead, the state seeks agreement. Some theorists of legislative debate and
law enactment have come to see it all as dealmaking. 198 Dealmaking
becomes a description apt to capture many court-based activities in this era
of the alteration of adjudication and of the emergence of ADR.
VI. CONCLUSION: CHANGES TO BE WELCOMED?
Before concluding, I want to be sure that I am not heard as putting
forth too pat a story; our legal culture is not unitary or without nuance. We
are in a time of transition and counter examples can be provided to the
trends I have delineated. Further, my task here is not to elaborate a
structural analysis of why procedural forms have been transformed over the
last three decades. 199 Rather, I have considered the changes in the ways in
which adjudication and ADR have been framed and discussed by members
of the legal establishment.
Having provided a procedural history for these past decades, I turn now
toward the future. I believe we are approaching a time when many a civil
trial will be characterized as a "pathological event."200 One possibility is
that this development is to be welcomed as an appropriate correction to
19 7 See Galanter & Lande, supra note 172, at 472-96 (charting ADR's disinterest in
rights and its emphasis on "needs" and "interests"). See also Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts,
Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH
CARE POL., POL'Y, & L. 439 (1993) (comparing the United States Supreme Court's role as a
"rights-enforcer" to one that enhances the discretionary powers of agencies).
198 See generally William N. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theoryfor Satutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988) (describing and
analyzing some public choice theories of legislation, with the focus on the role of courts as
enforcing the original "deal").
199 . HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 177.
200 This phrase comes from the minutes of recent debates within the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to Professor Ed Cooper, that
committee's Reporter, the discussion about whether to change Rule 68 to increase sanctions
for failure to settle resulted in some members of the committee concluding that it was "a
mistake to view trial as a pathological event, resulting from settlement miscalculations of the
parties. The system is designed to provide trials." Ed Cooper, Reporter, Minutes of the
Advisory Committee of Civil Rules 20 (Oct. 21-23, 1993). See also Yeazell, supra note 14, at
667.
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what John Langbein calls the "too trial-centered" Anglo-American
tradition. 201 From this perspective, one must recall that a strong source of
pressure for ADR comes from the judiciary. Judicial endorsement of ADR
is a demonstration from individuals with firsthand knowledge of the
weakness of adjudication, its failures and limitations. To the extent judicial
support of ADR affects our understanding of the value of adjudication,
judges may wisely be participating in a societal shove that will result in the
demise of civil adjudication as it is currently understood. 202 Further, the
decline of civil adjudication-in law courts-and its shift to governmental
agencies, claims facilities, and private dispute resolution centers may be the
appropriate denouement of this cycle of procedural reform. 20 3
Alternatively, anxiety about the triumph of ADR can come from across
the spectrum, from those perceived to be proponents of ADR as well as
from those styled proponents of adjudication. Proponents of ADR have
succeeded in making it "an integral part of our federal judicial system."204
In the process, they have helped to change both "our federal judicial
system" and ADR. 205
For those who envisioned ADR as the blossoming of something
different and generative, they should worry (as scholars such as Carrie
Menkel-Meadow and Lucy Katz do) about its institutionalization and its
transformation into the very adversarial processes that they had hoped to
avoid. 206 As courts make ADR their own, that formalization may well
201 John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1059 (1994). See also Yeazell, supra note 14, at
675-76 (reviewing changes in procedure over the past two centuries).
2 02 See Yeazell, supra note 14. For an argument that United States adjudicatory
procedures would greatly benefit from reformation, see John Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 823 (1985).
203 Here one might return to MacNeil, and his point that the state is the "Johnny come
lately" to dispute resolution and the waning of the centrality of its role may well be seen as
part of an ongoing reformulation of modes of dispute resolution. See supra notes 2-7.
204 Broderick, supra note 81, at 225.
205 A recent example of the emerging blur comes from DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l,
Inc. v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1994), in which, in
"[tihis procedurally remarkable case," a magistrate judge sat as an arbitrator, a role the
Seventh Circuit concluded would have been impermissibly adopted. The court decided to
construe the events as an agreement between the parties and magistrate judge "to an
abbreviated judicial procedure rather than an unauthorized arbitral one." Id. at 1168.
206 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 119, at 5, 13-16 (ADR was meant to "challenge" the
adversarial system, but instead ADR has been taken over and changed by the system.
Capture, "colonization," and co-optation have transformed ADR into "just another stop in the
'litigotiation' game"); Katz, supra note 92, 1, 5 ("voluntary nature of alternatives has been
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undermine the very attributes of ADR that prompted its praise. Further, as
courts compel ADR, the relationship between ADR and volition weakens,
pushing it ever closer to a state-imposed mode of resolution. On the other
hand, when ADR mimes adjudication, the critique of ADR as a lawless or
factiless process loses strength.207
Similarly, those who think adjudication has something to offer had
better start explaining why one would aspire to a preserve for adjudication,
and why relatively highly paid government officials (to wit federal and state
judges) should be empowered to do some of it. If there is an important and
affirmative-if not a cheerful-story to be told for the preservation of
adjudicatory forms, with judges in distinctive roles, and why a culture
would value, cherish, fund, encourage, and sometimes insist on
adjudication, then those who believe so had better speak up soon, for it is
becoming increasingly hard to hear those claims.
A vivid example of this problem is provided by turning to the work of
one prominent adjudication advocate, Professor Albert Alschuler. In his
essay, "Mediation with a Mugger," 20 8 he examined the justifications for
public subsidies for civil adjudication, concluded that the task of
"[ilmpartial adjudication" was a central one for government to undertake, 20 9
and worried about the "shortage of adjudicative services." 210 He urged that
adjudication be remodeled, to respond to problems of procedural complexity
eroded," and it is problematic for ADR to take on formalistic characteristics of adjudication).
See also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for
Statutory Reform, 5 J. Disp. REsoL 231, 233 (1990) (criticizing Supreme Court enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate as undermining the volition critical to arbitration's integrity, and
lauding arbitration for its capacity to provide "adjudicatory self-determination"); Richard C.
Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAw., Feb. 1994, at 53-54 (growing concern about the
bills of court-appointed, court-annexed ADR providers); Susan S. Silbey, Mediation
Mythology, 9 NEGoTIA'rboN J. 349, 353 (1993) (critiquing proposed "guidelines for selecting
mediators" as both wrongly portraying the role and also restricting access to the profession).
C. Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rnv. 81 (1992)
(calling for constitutional rights in private contractual arbitration to ensure due process
fairness).
207 See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen, Lynn Mather & Richard J. Maiman, Lawyers in and
Everyday Life: Mediation in Divorce Practice, 28 J. L. & Soc" 149, 183 (1994) (Mediation
of divorce in Maine as is used in "heavily litigated" cases, relies on "legal rules," serves as a
"relatively formal adjunct to negotiation," and "strengthens ... the ability of lawyers to
influence decisions.").
208 Albert Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicaive Services
and the Needfor a Two-Tier Trial System in Cvil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1808 (1986).
209 Id. at 1816.
210 Id. at 1818-24.
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and the capacity of litigants to inflict wasteful costs on each other.211 His
preferred solutions all seek "a simplified form of adjudication"-that would
include the possibility of impartial factfinding.2 12 His preference is for
"first instance" and "second instance" trials, scaled back in an effort to
distribute adjudicatory services.213 When one reads the details of
Alschuler's proposal, it sounds quite like court-annexed arbitration,2 14
albeit sometimes with public access.
215
But court-annexed arbitration, which could be described as scaled down
adjudication, may also become vulnerable to the criticisms that animate its
installation. Many of the rhetorical claims made on behalf of ADR may
prompt policy makers to create settlement mechanisms rather than
procedures that closely resemble adjudication. The emphasis placed on the
quality of information possessed by the parties and on the cost and
inefficiencies of transferring that information to a third party decision maker
puts pressure on court-annexed arbitration, which could well be called
"short trials." Moreover, empirical research has raised questions about
whether court-annexed arbitration saves time or money. Robert MacCoun's
study of court-annexed arbitration in New Jersey found that neither public
costs were saved nor time to disposition shortened in the arbitration
211 Alschuler, supra note 208, at 1824-25, 1830-31.
212Id. at 1837.
213 Id. at 1845-54.
214 Some courts have adopted "tracking" programs that provide less process for
particular kinds of cases, thereby approximating some of what Alschuler seeks. See, e.g., the
Delaware Senate Joint Resolution, 1993 DEL. S.J.R. 28 (Jan. 27, 1994) (in commercial cases
in which more than a million dollars is in dispute, parties may consent to summary procedures
with limited discovery and a shortened trial before a judge). Further, as discussed above, in
the revision of the Wiko doctrine, private arbitration and adjudication also become
assimilated, compared to each other and perceived to share similar characteristics and goals.
See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
215 According to Bernstein, federal court-based ADR programs "cannot offer parties the
same degree of secrecy as private ADR programs." Bernstein, supra note 125, at 2240.
However, the survey of voluntary programs done for this essay makes less clear the
relationship between court-based ADR and privacy; those programs did not uniformly report
that public access was available. Two of the eight districts stated the public could attend
arbitrations; three stated that it was up to the parties; and three had no knowledge or provided
no guidance on public access. Moreover, none reported retaining the transcripts of arbitration
proceedings. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (detailing survey done). See also In re
A.H. Robins Co. (Anderson), 42 F.3d 870 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that arbitration rules
created by a claims facility within bankruptcy and promulgated by the Dalkon Shield Trust
were entitled to deference, reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).
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program. 216 While court-annexed arbitration may be cheaper and quicker
than trial, few cases in fact go to trial, and court-annexed arbitration is
slower and more expensive than settlement. In short, the barrage of anti-
adjudication claims in the promotion of state-run and state-mandated ADR
may hit court-annexed arbitration as well. The interaction may well cause
the ADR spectrum to narrow as well, because the ideological claims
increasingly point toward settlement as the desired mode of dispute
resolution.2 17
As this century draws to its end, we can observe the melding of ADR
into adjudication, and then the narrowing of ADR and its refocusing as a
tool to produce contractual agreements among disputants. The focus is
shifting from adjudication to resolution. Frank Sander's lovely image of the
accessible, multi-doored courthouse-with one door wide open for
adjudication-has now been eclipsed. The door to the twentieth century's
version of adjudication is closing.
2 16 MacCoun, supra note 125, at 230. See also Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass
Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 98-99 (court-annexed arbitration
may be preferred for providing more process to litigants than does settlement).
217 "Bargaining in the shadow of the law" continues to be an apt metaphor. A5 the
"law" moves to embrace alternative dispute resolution, its shadow moves as well. -
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